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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND HEALTH 
 
by 
 
Darin Frank Ullman 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016  
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott J. Adams 
 
This dissertation consists of three chapters. My first chapter examines the effect of 
mandatory first time offender ignition interlock laws.  Specifically, I use difference in difference 
techniques to estimate the effect of the laws on alcohol related fatal accidents.  I also discuss and 
link behavioral models of deterrence and incapacitation to the results, so that finding can easily be 
interpreted.  Results of the study provide pivotal policy relevant information that are essential to 
maximizing public health and reducing dangerous alcohol related crashes.  In particular, results 
show that states which adopt legislation that requires mandatory participation of first time 
offenders in ignition interlock programs, at low blood alcohol levels, experience significant 
reductions in alcohol related accidents.    
The second chapter of my dissertation uses detailed vehicle specifications to analyze the 
impact identifiable vehicle characteristics and technological progress has on fleet fuel economy by 
vehicle type and class.  Estimates are generated following a cobb-douglas framework and an 
identification strategy of a widely cited American Economic Review (AER) paper developed by 
Christopher Knittel in 2011.  Results reveal that vehicle manufactures will have a difficult task 
complying with the new footprint-based C.A.F.E. standards by changing identifiable vehicle 
characteristics alone.  I also find evidence that more stringent footprint-based standards may create 
incentives for manufacturers to increase vehicle size to lower the burden of compliance.  
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My final chapter, uniquely contributes to the literature on medical marijuana laws (MML) 
by being the first paper to analyze the impact of MML on employee sickness absence.  With 
evolving MML and an increasing number of states with recreational marijuana laws it will be 
important for economist to understand how these laws impact markets and in particular the labor 
market.  The paper lays the groundwork for future research in this area by Utilizing the Current 
Population Survey, the study identifies that absences due to sickness decline following the 
legalization of medical marijuana.  The effect is stronger in states with “lax” medical marijuana 
regulations, for full-time workers, and for middle-aged males, which is the group most likely to 
hold medical marijuana cards.  
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1 Locked and not Loaded: First Time Offenders and State Ignition 
Interlock Programs 
1.1. Introduction 
Accidents involving drunk drivers impose enormous social and economic costs on society.  
The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) reports that in 2012, 10,322 
people died in drunk driving crashes and an additional 290,000 individuals were injured.  
Furthermore, they estimate that drunk driving costs the United States $199 billion every year and 
90% of these costs occurred in crashes involving a drunk driver with a blood alcohol concentration 
(BAC) of .08 or higher (Report No. DOT HS 812 013).1  Given the magnitude of these societal 
and economic costs, government officials are continuously enacting policies to prevent drunk 
driving and the all too common fatal motor vehicle crashes that follow.  
One such policy designed to prevent drunk driving is the ignition interlock program.  The 
ignition interlock device (IID) is designed to prevent vehicle operation when the driver is impaired 
from alcohol consumption.  Drivers are required to provide a breath specimen to the device before 
it will allow the operator to start the vehicles’ engine.  Legislation to support the use of the device 
began in the late 1980’s.  Improvements made to the device in the early 1990’s led to the adoption 
of the program by counties and states across the country.2  Currently, numerous states have also 
implemented the program to include mandatory participation by first time drunk driving offenders,  
a group that the Center for Disease Control (CDC) has found to have driven drunk more than 80 
times before being caught.   
                                                           
1 The estimated $199 billion costs include societal costs such as “lost quality of life”.  Pure economic costs are equal 
to $59 billion in 2010 for alcohol involved accident.  Costs are expressed in 2010 dollars 
2 Second generation IID improvements help prevent falsified tests.  New features include: hum tone recognition, 
filtered air detection, blow abort, and random running tests (Collier DW. 1994). 
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Previous research has highlighted the effectiveness of the IID technology.  In particular, a 
recent meta-analysis has shown that the risk of recidivism for DWIs can be reduced up to 64 
percent (Willis et al. 2004).  Other research has highlighted the lack of success of comparable 
drunk driving preventative policies, such as license suspensions.  For instance, studies show that 
50 to 75 percent of convicted drunk drivers whose license has been suspend continue to drive. 
(Peck R.C. et al. 1995 and Beck K.H. et al. 1999).   
This paper advances the literature on drunk driving laws and ignition interlocks in several 
important ways.  To begin, it is the first to apply difference in difference estimation methods to 
analyze the effectiveness of current state polices that require mandatory installation of IID’s for 
first time drunk driving offenders.  Though this framework has become standard in policy 
evaluation, the identification strategy controls for unobservable cross state heterogeneity, in 
alcohol related behaviors, which can lead to biased estimates in traffic fatalities (Dee 1999).  
Additionally, given what we know from prior research on ignition interlocks and the failures of 
other drunk driving laws to prevent the behavior, this paper provides critical estimates of the 
magnitude and effect of mandatory ignition interlock laws, which directly incapacitates offenders 
from potentially fatal future drunk driving decisions.   
Another contribution of the study is that is it provides suggestive evidence that 
incapacitation is the primary reason for the estimated effect, rather than the deterrence.  Finally, 
the study provides pivotal public policy information for current and future legislation.   
Specifically, the results from the study uncover that states that adopt “strong” (i.e., applied to 
drivers convicted of having BAC .08 or greater) mandatory IID installation for first time offenders 
experience a significant reduction in the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver.  This 
result is also negative and significant when considering the number of fatal accidents involving 
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drivers with positive alcohol levels.  However, results for states that adopt “weak” (i.e., only for 
drivers with BAC .15 or greater) mandatory IID installation for first time offenders show no 
significant effect in decreasing the number of fatal accidents with alcohol involvement.   
In detail, the preferred estimates on strong IID adoption indicate that fatal accidents 
involving a drunk driver decrease by 9% and fatal accidents involving a driver with a positive 
alcohol level decrease by nearly 7%.  In terms of fatal accidents cause by a drunk driver, this is 
potentially equivalent to 1.4 fewer fatal accidents a month for a typical state.  Focusing on the 
reduction in fatal accidents from drunk drivers alone and considering that the NHTSA estimates 
that the economic cost of a fatal accident is approximately $1,650,000, the national adoption of 
strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders could potentially save $1.39 billion dollars.  
If we instead consider the Department of Transportation (DOT) guidelines for the value of 
statistical life (VSL) which is equal to $9,100,000, then the total saving from the saved lives of 
non-drivers alone is equal to $2.95 billion dollars in a year.   
These results are robust to alternative models with varying controls, including state and 
time fixed effects, state-time trends, population changes, economic climate, demographic 
characteristics, other drunk driving polices, and taxes related to gasoline and beer.  Additionally, 
California’s pilot program provides an excellent case study at the county-level to analyze the 
effectiveness of strong mandatory first time offender ignition interlock programs.  These within-
state results do not suffer from the potential heterogeneity that sometimes plagues cross-state 
analyses. The results are again robust and support the findings at the state level.   
Overall, given the finding in this paper it is prudent for policy makers to take into 
consideration the effectiveness of strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders in 
preventing fatalities as a result of alcohol involved accidents.  With 14 states that currently have 
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weak ignition interlock laws for first time offenders and 11 states who still have no mandatory 
policy for using the IID for first time offenders, this study provides essential information in 
designing lifesaving public policy related to drunk driving.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays the ground work for the 
underlying behavioral models and provides a brief background on ignition interlock laws.  Section 
3 discusses the related literature.  Section 4 describes the data and methodology.  Section 5 explores 
the empirical results at the state level, discusses the results, briefly describes cost benefit analysis 
of the IID, provides robustness tests using an alternative BAC measure, different dependent 
variables, as well as presents the California case study.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.2. Conceptual Framework and Background 
1.2.1. Behavioral Model 
 The vast majority of economic studies related to drunk driving explicitly or implicitly adopt 
the framework of Becker’s (1968) expected utility model of criminal behavior.  The model and 
associated literature propose that individuals are deterred from illegal actions when the associated 
costs outweigh the benefits.  Evidence of deterrence in the drunk driving literature is inconclusive. 
As shown by Benson et al. (1999), deterrence alone has little effect on drunk driving without high 
probability of police involvement.   
 In addition to deterrence theory, others such as Shavell (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell 
(2007), have modeled optimal crime prevention through incapacitation.  Overall, when 
incapacitation is the goal, the length and number of individuals incapacitated increases with time, 
as long as the cost of incapacitating those individuals is less than the cost of the potential harm 
they could create.  Recent work by Miceli (2010, 2012) has also adapted the standard economic 
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model for crime to include both deterrence and incapacitation theory.  The unified model presents 
an optimal decision that either increases the level of incapacitation if the deterrence level is low or 
decreases the level of incapacitation if deterrence level is high.  
 In regards to mandatory ignition interlock laws, there is potential for both deterrence and 
incapacitation to influence individual behavior that yields the result estimated in this paper.  For 
instance, individuals may be deterred from drinking and driving because they fear potential 
negative social interactions.  Mandatory device installation could bring about unwanted 
interactions with family, friends, and co-workers that reveal the offender’s prior illegal activity.   
On the other hand, given that the device directly incapacitates individuals from operating their 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the more participants and greater probability of 
installment, means lower BAC levels on the roadways and reduced likelihood of drunk driving 
fatalities. 
 A reduction in fatal accidents itself is consistent with both the incapacitation and deterrence 
models.   However, I will engage in a number of tests that will be suggest the incapacitation model 
is more reasonable in the case of IIDs.3  In short, we would expect incapacitation to be stronger as 
the number of individuals affected by the law likely increases.  So, if the effects grows over time 
or the effect is stronger in locations where more individuals are expected to be incapacitated, then 
this supports the behavioral model of incapacitation more than deterrence.   
 
1.2.2. Basic Background  
                                                           
3 An event study, Figure 1.4., also suggests incapacitation, as there is a distinct lagged divergence in the trend of the 
drunk accident rate for the strong IID states versus the control states.  The lack of an immediate divergence in the 
trend likely results because it takes time for offenders to be convicted and have a device installed.  For instance, 
some states do not require installment until after a 45-90 day suspension of license is served.  Additionally, as time 
increase the number of program participants increases, which magnifies the effect.    
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In this section I briefly provide additional specifics on state ignition interlock programs 
and mandatory first time offender IID polices.4  Currently, all states have ignition interlock laws. 
However, until recently those laws did not included mandatory participation among first time 
offenders.  Mainly they were used for repeat offenders.   
Mandatory first time offender programs have been enacted in states in two forms: 1) 
interlock requirement starts on conviction with BAC of 0.08 or greater and 2) interlock 
requirement starts on conviction with BAC of 0.15 or greater.5  Although there is some small 
variations in the length of time, generally convicted first time offenders are required to have the 
device installed in their vehicle for a minimum of five months, but the length can exceed one year.6  
Another difference in state interlock programs is how they are administered, which according to 
the NHTSA can be grouped into three categories.7  Specifically, they are “administrative,” which 
is overseen by a department of motor vehicles or similar agency, “judicial,” which is mandated by 
the court system, and “hybrid” programs, which utilizes aspects of both of the prior mentioned 
groups.  Currently, states with first time offender programs are evenly split between each type.   
 
1.3. Related Literature  
 
1.3.1. Literature on Ignition Interlocks 
 
 A thorough review of the literature assessing the effectiveness of ignition interlocks was 
recently conducted by Elder et al. (2011), with a consensus of studies showing drivers with 
                                                           
4 I refrain from dedicating a large portion of the text to IID specifics because detailed documents are easily 
available. For instance, the NHTSA and MADD are heavy supporters of ignition interlock laws and both provide 
comprehensive specifics of the laws and programs, which can be found on their websites.  See: 
www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/IgnitionInterlocks_811883.pdf 
5 Three states have higher BAC limits for the weaker first time offender IID program. Minnesota (BAC=.16), 
Michigan (BAC=.17), and Nevada (BAC=.18).  They are included in the “weak” IID policy group.   
6 Summarized details of required installment length can be found here: 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-ignition-interlock-laws.aspx 
7 See DOT HS 811 8883 for details.   
7 
 
interlocks installed are at substantially less risk for recidivism.  Additionally, the review evaluated 
studies on the effect of ignition interlocks on motor vehicle crashes and driving, but just three 
studies were available for review and only two were deemed reliable.  The results of these studies 
suggested that in comparison to a group of individuals who were subject to suspended licenses, 
the ignition interlock group was found to have a higher crash risk.  This could be due to the fact 
that the IID group was also found to drive greater distances.  Also noted was that some studies 
found evidence that interlocks protected against alcohol-related crashes.   Additionally, in a study 
not included in the review by Lahausse et al. (2009), found that installing interlocks in all newly 
registered vehicles, in Australia, could reduce traffic fatalities up to 24% a year. 
Overall, the authors of the review are hesitant to draw any strong conclusions on the effect 
of ignition interlocks on motor vehicle crashes given the limited number of studies.  One major 
conclusion of the review however, is that the success of ignition interlock programs is determined 
by who participates and how it is implemented.  In particular, the authors’ posit that mandatory 
participation for first time offenders would likely be a major boost to overall public safety, and the 
program should not be used for just repeat or high BAC offenders.   
 Finally, the NHTSA has developed several reports related to ignition interlock programs, 
an example being “Ignition Interlock Institutes: Promoting the Use of Interlocks and 
Improvements to Interlock Programs” (2013).  Much of the reports focus on the IID research 
developed by Richard Roth.8 Primarily, Roth’s research evaluates the effectiveness of New 
Mexico’s interlock program. The studies find that the program has led to a substantial decrease in 
interlock users’ recidivism rates as well as a 28% decrease in the number of DWI fatalities from 
2005 to 2008 after the program moved to include first time offenders.   
                                                           
8 Research available at http://www.rothinterlock.org/welcome.htm. 
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1.3.2. Literature on Other Policies Related to Drunk Driving  
 The literature on the effect drunk driving policies have on fatal traffic crashes is vast.  
Several previous publications, for instance Eisenberg (2003), have detailed literature reviews so I 
refrain from providing anything but the highlights of the papers most applicable to my approach.   
In particular, several studies examine the effectiveness of BAC limit laws.  Dee (2001) uses an 
OLS fixed effects model and finds that .08 BAC regulations reduce the fatal traffic crash rate by 
7.2%, and the .10 BAC limit laws reduces the rate by 5.3%.  Eisenberg (2003) evaluates the effect 
of states switching from a .10 to .08 BAC limit and finds that the fatal crash rates falls by 3.1%.  
Conversely, Freeman (2007) and Grant (2010) show that the effect of switching from a .10 to .08 
BAC level is limited and that there is a declining effect of BAC limit laws over time.    
 In addition to BAC limit laws, Eisenberg (2003) also examines several other drunk driving 
policies, including zero tolerance, administrative license revocation, dram shop, open container, 
mandatory jail sentence for first conviction, and preliminary breath test laws.  The results of the 
analysis fit into the already mixed and conflicting conclusions of the previous research on these 
drunk driving polices, with dram shop laws being the only universally agreed upon effective 
policy.  Similarly, Dills (2010) finds that social host laws for minors has a significant negative 
effect drunk fatal crash rates among young adults between 18-20.  
 This study contributes to the existing literature in several unique and important facets.  
Specifically, it is the first to use a regression-identified specification to analyze the impact of 
mandatory participation of first time offenders in state ignition interlock programs.  Using panel 
data and variations across states, as well as within, the study is able to identify a causal effect of 
the program.  Though endogenity of the policy variable is always a concern in such studies, this 
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study includes controls for other polices enacted during the period and shows that the effect is 
observed apart from underlying trends in fatalities.  This lends support for the exogenity of the 
policy variable and presents the dynamic effect of the policy on drunk, BAC ≥ .08, and positive 
alcohol, BAC ≥ .01, fatal accidents.  Furthermore, this study provided additional information for 
policy makers that wish to implement the best possible programs to prevent deadly and costly 
alcohol related vehicle crashes. 
 
1.4. Data and methods 
1.4.1. Fatal accident data and state ignition interlock laws 
 Data on fatal vehicle crashes are obtained through the Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS) of the NHTSA.  It serves as the main source of data to generate the primary variables of 
interest.  Two of which are the monthly number of fatal accidents in a state for which a driver’s 
imputed BAC is greater or equal to .08 and the monthly number of fatal accidents in a state for 
which a driver’s imputed BAC is greater or equal to .01.  These two dependent variables indicate 
the number of fatal accidents that occur at the hands of drunk drivers and fatal accidents that occur 
with drivers that have positive alcohol levels.  The imputation of driver BAC is necessary because 
of rampant misreporting of actual BAC levels at crash scenes.  Although federal law requires BAC 
levels to be obtained for every fatal crash, this is often not done.  The NHTSA developed a multiple 
imputation procedure following suggestions by Rubin et al. (1998) that uses characteristic of 
individual crashes, such as time of day, time of week, and position of the car, to predict and impute 
a BAC level for cases in which this data are missing.9    Confirmation of the procedure’s accuracy 
in predicting driver BAC can be seen in the NHTSA (2002) report, “Transitioning to Multiple 
                                                           
9 The presence of an IID device in a vehicle involved in a crash is not use in the imputation process. 
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Imputation.”10  In what follows I routinely use the median or mean of the imputed BAC values for 
each driver.11   
 For this study, I link these counts of monthly state fatal accidents to state-level legislative 
data on strong and weak mandatory installation of the IID for first time offenders.  States that have 
enacted mandatory installation for first time offenders between 2001 and 2012 are branded as 
treatment states for one of the two treatment levels and are used to create the policy variables of 
interest in the form of dummy variables.  Information on dates and state coverage of ignition 
interlock laws was obtained from Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).12  For clarity, Table 
1.1. describes the first time offender ignition interlock laws and enactment dates for both types of 
treated states.13  
  The preferred estimates exclude Washington DC because of its unique driving conditions, 
as well as Alaska for its relatively small number of monthly fatal accidents.   Additionally, Iowa 
is considered to be a part of the weak treatment group because of its unique BAC level but is coded 
properly to represent its lack of within state variation.14  California’s first time offender policy is 
limited to the participation of four major counties—Los Angeles, Alameda, Sacramento, and 
Tulare.  However, given that these counties include some of California’s major metropolitan areas 
and account for over 13 million of the states’ population, it is included in the treatment group.15  
                                                           
10 Ten imputed BAC values are reported for each driver in a fatal accident.  The mean or median is used to 
categorize each driver as drunk, positive alcohol, or no alcohol.  Results are robust with both methods.   
11 Coupling the fact that previous actual values of driver BAC’s have been misreported along with the recent report 
by the NHTSA, which assures the accuracy of the imputation process, there should be no concern in using imputed 
values to determine the counts of alcohol involved fatal accidents.  Additionally, this practice has become very 
common in the drunk driving literature (Cumming et al. 2006; Adams et al. 2008; Romano et al. 2008; Williams et 
al. 2012).   In order to ensure that IID laws are not affecting predictors of BAC, I also estimated results using 
previous techniques of drunk driving related research.  Specifically, I regressed my models using only the times 
when most alcohol related accidents are believed to occur, i.e.: nights and weekends.  Results were consistent with 
those found using imputed BACs. 
12 See - http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/ignition-interlocks/status-of-state-ignition.html 
13 Table 1.1. notes, lists states that enact first time offender IID policies after 2012. 
14 Iowa’s mandatory policy has dictated that first time offenders with a BAC above .10 install the IID since 1995. 
15 Results of various models are robust without the inclusion of California.  
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The final data consist of 49 states, of which 12 are consider weak treatment states, 17 are strong 
treatment states, and the remaining 20 state are controls.  The data are evaluated over a 144 month 
period for a total of 7056 observations.   
 Table 1.2. provides descriptive statistics, including means of the two treatment groups and 
the control group used in analysis.  The statistics show that there has been an overall decrease in 
the raw number of fatal accidents involving drunk drivers in strong IID states, from 16.72 to 12.09 
fatal accidents per month. Considering the changes in average population that occur for the pre- 
and post-treat strong IID group, I also look at the rate of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver 
per 100,000 people, which in this case falls from .24 to .20.  This reduction does not account for 
downward trends that may be occurring over time for these types of accidents independent of the 
IID policies, which necessitates the fixed effects research design described later.  Estimates 
discussed later in the paper provide evidence that the decrease is substantial and significant for 
states that have adopted strong IID laws for first time offenders.  A similar decrease in the number 
of fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels is also visible in the descriptive 
statistics, of strong IID states from 20.39 to 14.69 per month.  The rate per 100,000 people using 
average population also falls from .29 to .245.  This again proves to be a substantial and significant 
decrease in the estimate results.  Given that the number of fatal accidents is highly variable in 
smaller states, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are weighted by the state-year population 
size obtained from the Census Bureau.   
 
1.4.2. Methodology 
 Individual numbers of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and fatal accidents involving 
drivers with positive alcohol levels are first aggregated into state monthly totals.  Those results are 
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then pooled into the strong and weak states that have mandatory IID laws for first time offenders.  
Remaining states that do not have either of these laws or do not change during 2001-2012 are then 
pooled into the control group.   The basic analysis takes the form of a standard difference-in-
difference fixed effects model: 
 
 (1) FAst = α + ηs + τt + µst + β1StrIIDst +β2WkIIDst + λ'Xst + εst , 
 
where subscripts s and t denote states and months.  The terms ηs and τt are the state and month 
fixed effects, respectively. To control for other factors that may impact the number of fatal 
accidents over time, such as weather and construction, I include a complete set of state-time trends 
unique to each state in some specifications. The state-time trend is the linear time trend “τ” 
interacted with individual states “η”, that is “τ*η”, indicated above as µst.  Even though including 
comprehensive state-time trends in the model can often limit some identifying power, results prove 
robust.   StrIID and WkIID are the policy variables and indicate states that have a strong or weak 
ignition interlock mandatory program for first time offenders.  Thus, β1 and β2 are the primary 
coefficients of interest.   As a reminder, strong states require participation if drivers are caught 
under the influence of alcohol with a BAC of .08 or greater and weak states require participation 
if the individuals BAC is .15 or greater.   
 FA is defined as the log (number of fatal accidents +1) involving a driver whose BAC is greater 
or equal to .08. Alternatively, estimates are also performed where the dependent variable FA is 
defined as the log (number of fatal accidents +1) involving a driver who has a BAC level of .01 or 
greater, referred to earlier as a positive alcohol level.  The log format was chosen to provide an 
13 
 
easy interpretation of the effect of policy variables in terms of percentages.16   Log accident 
estimates of equation (1) are weighted by state-year population.  All estimate standard-errors are 
corrected for correlation across states by means of clustering (Arellano 1987).  
 The X matrix contains a set of additional controls.  I include controls for the log of the 
population for each state, the proportion of males, the proportion of specific races, the median age 
in each state, and real income per capita represent in 2012 dollars.  The proportion of males is 
included because males are more likely to be involved in fatal accidents.17  Other factors for which 
I control that might be related to fatal accidents include the prevailing gasoline tax, beer tax, and 
unemployment rate.  Beer taxes for each state are included and represented in 2012 cents.  State 
unemployment rates, which were constructed from census data, are included because economic 
volatility during the time period may have led to fewer drivers on the road (Cotti and Tefft 2011).  
Finally, estimates also include controls for a selection of other relevant drunk driving policies 
enacted during the sample period that could be correlated with IID policy variable of interest.  For 
instance, policy variables for .08 BAC limits (BAC08) and open container (OPEN) laws were 
included, along with two polices directed at reducing underage drinking, which are license 
suspension or revocation for underage purchase, possession, and consumption (UND21) and 
liability for hosting underage drinking parties (PARTY). 18,19  Information and effective dates for 
the above policy variables was obtained from the Alcohol Policy Information System of the 
National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. 
                                                           
16 Given the count nature of these dependent variables, for robustness and to ensure results are not driven by the 
model choice, estimates were also preformed using an unweighted Poisson model.  The results were consistent and 
had no substantive effect on the conclusion of the analysis.  Negative Binomial estimates were not used because this 
model has been previously criticized as not being a true fixed effects estimator (Allsion et al. 2002) 
17 See Washington State Department of Health (2012) for representative statistics.     
18 An administrative license suspensions policy variable was not included because only one state (New York) in the 
sample exhibited any variation of policy during the sample period.  
19 Coefficients of these policies are omitted from results tables, as are many other controls, for brevity.  Full 
regression results for the various dependent variables are available in the appendix.   
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 In addition to estimating equation (1), I examine a similar model at the county-level using 
California’s ignition interlock pilot program.  The program has the same guidelines of mandatory 
participation for first time offenders as the strong states described earlier, but there is no longer a 
weak treatment group.  Previous state-level controls such as gasoline tax and beer tax are no longer 
included, and the state unemployment rate is replaced by county-level unemployment rate.  State 
and month fixed effects are now transformed to county and year fixed effects.  Year fixed effects 
replace months because there are numerous months in which several of California’s counties have 
zero fatal accidents involving a drunk driver.  Thus, the dependent variables for the number of 
accidents involving a drunk driver and the number of accidents involving a driver with positive 
alcohol levels are aggregated at the county-year level and include years 2007 through 2012.  The 
California case study results are intended to provide a robustness check on the effectiveness of 
strong IID mandatory first time offender programs.   
 
1.5. Results 
1.5.1. State-level Results 
 I begin by estimating equation (1) at the state-level for both treatment groups and controls.  
Table 1.3. provides the results for fatal accidents involving a drunk driver.20  Additionally, results 
are provided without and with state-time trends and indicate the robustness of the identification 
strategy.  As indicated by the results, strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders, reduce 
the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver by 9%.  The result is significant at the 5 
percent level, including state-time trends.  The results also indicate the lack of effectiveness of 
                                                           
20 An accident is indicated as a drunk fatal accident if a drivers BAC is greater or equal to .08, using median imputed 
BAC level of drivers. 
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weak ignition interlock laws (i.e.: BAC ≥ .15) for first time offenders in reducing the number of 
fatal accidents involving a drunk driver, as all estimates yield positive but insignificant results.   
 To consider the effectiveness of both strong and weak IID laws for first time offenders in 
preventing fatal accidents involving drivers with positive alcohol levels, equation (1) is estimated 
with the dependent variable now indicated as the number of fatal accidents with drivers who have 
a BAC greater or equal to .01.  The results for these estimates can be seen in Table 1.4.  Again, it 
is apparent that states with strong ignition nterlock laws for first time offenders are able to 
substantially lower the number of fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels.  
For instance, results without and with controls for state-time trends, indicate that the number of 
fatal accidents involving a driver with a positive alcohol level decreased by 9% and 7%.  These 
results are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level.  With regard to weak IID states, the results once 
again indicate that the more relaxed policy for drinking and driving for first time offenders does 
not have a significant impact on lowering the number of fatal accidents involving a driver with 
positive alcohol levels.   
 In all models for both drunk drivers (BAC ≥.08) and drivers with positive alcohol (BAC 
≥.01) lead and lag effects were tested in regards to the policy variables (i.e.: strongIID and 
weakIID). These results can be seen in Table 1.5., separated for regression by drunk, column (1), 
and positive alcohol, column (2), and by weak and strong leads and lags.  In all cases, no significant 
results were found for leads.  This supports the exogenity of the policy variables, as opposed to an 
effect from a previously existing trend.  It is also unlikely that the policies would have any effect 
before enactment due to alcohol influenced drivers anticipating the enforcement of the law.  A 
pretreatment graph, Figure 1.1., displays the trend of the treatment groups and control group.  
There are no differences in the trends.  Additionally, the dynamic framework of Table 1.5., also 
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provides additional insight on the impact of the strong IID policy. Results show that a greater and 
more statistically significant impact prevails the longer the policy has been in place. This is not 
surprising. As more offenders are prosecuted and the number of devices installed increases, the 
more likely and stronger the potential impact of the policy, which further suggests incapacitation 
as the dominant effect.21  
 It is worthwhile to convert the previously mentioned percentages into an actual number of 
reduced fatal accidents involving drunk drivers.  To do so, I focus my attention on the log accident 
estimates that includes a full set of controls, along with a complete set of state-time trends.  In 
2012, the NHTSA reported that there were 9,364 fatal accidents resulting in 10,322 fatalities 
involving a driver with a BAC .08 or higher (DOT HS 811 870, 2013). Using this information and 
the estimation results, I find that the reduction in fatal accidents from strong ignition interlock laws 
for first time offenders would be equal to 1.4 fewer fatal accidents involving a drunk driver for a 
typical state in a typical month.22  We can also think about this in terms of saved lives.  Using the 
FARS data and estimation results, the 1.4 fewer fatal accidents involving a drunk driver would 
approximately save 1.54 lives per state-month.  Additionally, of the 10,322 reported fatalities 
involving a driver with BAC .08 or higher, 6,688 were the drunk driver (DOT HS 812 032, 2013). 
If we focus our concern to the lost lives of non-driver crash victims, then the 1.4 fewer fatal 
accidents from strong IID laws for first time offenders would save approximately .54 non-driver 
lives for a typical state in a typical month.23  Over an entire year, national adoption of strong 
ignition interlock laws for first time offenders would save 324 innocent victims lives from drunk 
                                                           
21 When a quadratic state-time trend is added to the estimates of both drunk and positive alcohol models, the effect 
of the IID policies are soaked up, suggesting a ramping of enforcement and incapacitation.   
22 1.4 = (9,364*.09) / (12*50) 
23 .54= (1.54 - (1.54*.648)); (6688/10322)=.648 
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drivers.24   With regard to fatal accidents involving a driver with a BAC .01 or higher, the NHTSA 
reported that 10,918 such fatal accidents occurred in 2012, resulting in 12,041 fatalities (DOT HS 
811 870, 2013).   Following a similar process, using the estimated 7% reduction in fatal accidents 
involving a driver with positive alcohol levels from having strong ignition interlock laws for first 
time offenders, yields approximately 1.27 fewer fatal accidents involving a driver with positive 
alcohol levels, for a typical state in a typical month.25  This reduced number of fatal accidents 
involving a driver with positive alcohol levels could potentially save 1.41 lives per state-month, 
of which .50 would be assumed to be the lives of non-drivers.26 
 
1.5.2. Discussion of Results 
 It is useful to first assess the plausibility of results of this magnitude. In other words, is the 
use of IID sufficiently large enough to account for up to a 9% reduction in fatalities among drunk 
drivers?   To provide support for the plausibility, Figure 1.2. provides two side by side graphs.  
One shows the estimated (in use) IIDs since 2005, the year in which states began to enact laws 
requiring mandatory participation for first time offenders, until year 2013.27  The other shows the 
number of alcohol impaired driving fatalities, where the drivers BAC level was .08 or higher.  
Figure 1.3. plots both graphs together and normalizes the number of interlocks in use and number 
of fatalities by their first year value.   From the graphs, there appears to be a distinct correlation 
between the increase in the number of interlocks and the decrease in the number drunk driving 
fatalities.  Furthermore, since the inclusion of first time offenders in the interlock program, the 
number of estimated interlocks has increased by over 245%, whereas the number of fatalities has 
                                                           
24 324=.54*12*50 
25 1.27 = (10,918)*.07 / (12*50) 
26 .50= 1.41 - (1.41*.642)); (7730/12041)=.642 
27 Data is limited to 2005 and after and was obtained from http://www.rothinterlock.org/welcome.htm. 
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fallen by 25%.  Also, the majority of interlock use can be linked to states that require mandatory 
first offender participation.  Specifically, in 2012 it was estimated that there were 280,000 
interlocks in use, of which over 80% were in strong and weak first time offender law states, with 
nearly 2/3 in strong states alone.  Overall, these graphs provide evidence that the use of IIDs is 
large enough to generate the results uncovered in this study.  
 Additionally, since California enacted its pilot program in 2010, the number of interlocks 
installed for first time offenders for the four pilot counties went from about 2,348 to 43,574 by 
2013, a nearly 1800% increase in IIDs for first time offenders (Chapman et al. 2015).  This, along 
with the density of the population and driving conditions in counties where the program was 
installed, could explain why the effect in the case study is larger than the state level analysis. 28  
 In addition to understanding plausibility, it is important to policy makers to understand 
whether it is deterrence or incapacitation that is underlying the results.  There are a number of 
reasons that suggest incapacitation.  First, Figure 1.4. presents the average monthly drunk accident 
rate for strong treated states. The accident rate is aligned by each state’s treatment date, where 
negative values indicate pre-treatment and positive values indicate post-treatment.  For 
comparison, the average weighted rate of drunk driving accidents is also presented for the control 
states.  While pre-treatment trends look similar, there is a distinct divergence in the trend compared 
to the control states that begins approximately five months after the enactment.  Since offenders 
need to be caught and the devices installed, we would expect such a lagged effect.  If deterrence 
was indeed driving the results, we should see more immediate impacts.29  It is important to 
recognize that the values in Figure 1.4. are not regression adjusted, which again necessitates the 
                                                           
28 For density of traffic in California treated areas, see California Department of Public Health website: 
http://www.ehib.org/page.jsp?page_key=980.  
29 Offenders generally have to serve a 45-90 day license suspension before a device can be installed.  
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difference in difference methodology.  Overall, the figure does provide further support for 
incapacitation.     
Second, one would also expect that strong laws would have a greater incapacitation effect 
than weak laws because it applies to a broader group of drivers and affects more offenders.  
Specifically, the BAC limit of .08 is nearly half of the .15 BAC limit weak laws require.  As a 
result, strong laws create a greater probability of participation because a wider span of coverage 
exists.  This is supported by results.  In strong states, where participation of offenders is more 
likely, alcohol related accidents are significantly reduced.  However, in weak states, where 
participation is much less likely, there is no estimated effect on alcohol related accidents.  
Additionally, dynamic timing of events results in Table 1.5., further exhibit the broader coverage 
of strong laws.  The results show that the magnitude and significance of the law increase as time 
goes by, which is likely because of greater offender program involvement.  All of this evidence 
provides additional support for incapacitation.  
 
1.5.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Vehicle crashes involving a drunk driver impose enormous social and economic cost on 
society.  In order to examine the cost-effectiveness of strong IID laws for first time offenders, I 
compare the savings generated from preventing alcohol involved crashes and fatalities to the cost 
of an interlock program.  Since 90% of all costs occur in crashes involving a drunk driver with a 
BAC of .08 or higher, I focus my cost-benefit analysis to this group alone.  
 In 2010, the NHTSA estimated that an alcohol involved fatal accident generates economic 
costs of $1,650,000 in 2010 dollars.  This total comes from a variety of potential costs, including 
medical, insurance, legal, property damage, etc. all of which are magnified when the accident is 
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fatal.  Given that the prior estimation results, I can predict that the national adoption of this policy 
could save up to 1.39 billion dollars in economic costs.30  Similarly, assuming that a lost life is 
worth $9,100,000, (U.S. Department of Transportation 2013), then the non-driver lives saved by 
strong IID laws for first time offenders would be approximately $2.95 billion. .31     
In comparison, the cost of the ignition interlock program is fractional to the potential 
savings just discussed.  According to IgnitionInterlockDevice.org, the costs associated with the 
device amounts to $50-200 installation fee and an additional monthly fee of $50-100.  Overall, this 
equates to about $2-4 per day over a year period, or roughly the cost of a drink at a bar.  If we 
aggregate these numbers to include the 280,000 reported in use devices by the NHTSA for 2012, 
for all convicted drunk driving offenders, the total cost of installment is approximately between 
$204 million to $409 million a year.32 This is about 7 to 14 percent of the total potential benefits 
from the saved lives of non-drivers.  More importantly, the offender is responsible for the cost of 
the device, thus the potential benefits are realized by society but the cost is paid by the offender.   
Additionally, according to incapacitation theory, a high level of incapacitation is ideal 
when the cost to society, of the illegal activity, is large and the cost of incapacitation is small.  
Thus, the approximated cost and benefit of the first time offender IID program discussed above, 
suggests that incapacitation of offenders should be the goal of the program.  
  
1.5.4. Robustness Checks   
 Although the previously estimated models are viewed as reasonable and able to identify 
the impact of ignition interlock laws for first time offenders, it is important to recognize that there 
                                                           
30 $1.39 bill= (9364*.09)*$1,650,000 
31 $2.95 billion = $9,100,000*324 
32 See (Report No. DOT HS 811 815) for ignition interlock use data. 
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are alternative ways to ways to measure individual BAC levels and different possible definitions 
of the dependent variables.  In order to verify the results are robust to alternative choices additional 
estimates, of those alternatives are presented in this section.  These robustness results are located 
in Table 1.6.  For comparison, the first panel repeats the Tables 1.3. and 1.4. policy variable results 
from columns (2) and (3). 
 The first robustness check uses an alternative measure of individuals BAC level.  Results 
are in Panel A and use mean imputed values of driver BAC to identify the drunkest driver in an 
accident and to categorize drivers as either drunk, BAC ≥ .08, or positive alcohol, BAC ≥ .01. The 
change is made in order to see if the earlier choice of using median imputed BAC levels had any 
impact on the results.  The alternative mean BAC measure prove to be nearly identical in both 
magnitude and significance level compared to the previous median BAC estimates.  Results are 
significant for both drunk and positive alcohol accidents at the 1% level without state-time trends 
and at the 5 and 10 percent level for drunk drivers and positive alcohol when a state-time trend is 
added.  Additionally, the results using the alternative BAC measure consistently indicate that 
strong IID laws for first time offenders substantially decrease the number of fatal accidents caused 
by a drunk driver, by approximately 8%.  Again, all results indicate weak IID laws have no 
significant impact.   
 Next, I test for robustness of the dependent variable by estimating an alternative dependent 
variable and two other definitions of the number alcohol-related fatal accidents.  The first result in 
Panel B changes the dependent variable to the log of the number of drivers who were drinking and 
involved in a fatal accident.  It is reasonable to believe that if IID laws for first time offenders 
reduce the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver than it should also reduce the number 
of drunk or positive alcohol drivers who took part in a fatal accident.  The results indicate that 
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states with strong IID laws for first time offenders significantly reduce the number of drunk drivers 
by 11% and 10%, without and with state-time trends respectively.  These results are significant at 
the 1% and 5% level.  However, results for states with weak IID laws indicate that the policy had 
no significant impact on the number of drunk or positive alcohol drivers involved in a fatal 
accident.  Second, to test the sensitivity of the linear results using log accidents (instead of levels), 
the number of alcohol-related fatal accidents as the measure for my dependent variable.  The results 
do not change the conclusion that states with strong IID laws significantly reduce the number of 
fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and the number of fatal accidents involving drivers with 
positive alcohol levels.  Whereas states with weak IID laws for first time offenders do not 
significantly reduce alcohol-related fatal accidents.  I also define the dependent variable as the 
number of alcohol-related fatal accidents per 100,000 state residents, which is a common form of 
the dependent variable in previous fatal accident analysis literature.  Once again, the results are 
consistent and highly significant at the 1 and 5 percent level without and with state-time trends.33   
 In addition to the robust results discussed above, I also do some work to refine the control 
group using propensity score analysis.  These results are located in the appendix as Table 1a.  After 
matching treated states with the best available control states, results again indicate that policy 
enactment for strong states led to a statistically significant reduction in both the number of drunk 
and positive alcohol fatal accidents.  Whereas the weak IID policy has not.  A dependent variable 
of the number of accidents involving a driver that is under 21 was also examined.  This result can 
be seen in the appendix in Table 2a.  Again, the result of interlock program was negative and 
                                                           
33 The number of non-alcohol related accidents was used as a falsification exercise.  Given that this is not the target 
group of the interlock program it is reasonable to hypothesis that the dependent variable should yield no significant 
results.   With both mean and median BAC levels used to identify a driver as no alcohol, no significant effects of IID 
polices on fatal accidents were found.  Results can be seen in the appendix.  
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significant at the 5 percent level, even with including state-time trends.  Individuals under 21 are 
also subject to installation of an IID under their first offense for alcohol involved driving.  
However, part of the result could be driven by preventing those legal age drinkers who would have 
chosen to drink and drive at night or on the weekends, from crashing into younger under 
experienced drivers.  For instance, the Insurance Institute of Highway safety found that in 2012, 
49% of under 21 accidents occurred at night.   
 Finally, Table 1.8. reports the results of the first time offender IID polices impact on total 
fatalities.  Overall, the enactment of the strong interlock policy had a negative impact of 5% in 
reducing total fatal accidents, which is significant at 1 percent level without state-time trends.  This 
result helps confirm the impact of the IID polices is likely the result of a reduction in fatal accidents 
involving drivers under the influence of alcohol.  When trends are added the result falls to a 3% 
reduction in fatal accidents, and significant at the 10 percent level.   
 
1.5.5. California Case Study 
 California enacted a pilot program on July 1, 2010 that is set to run through December 31, 
2015, which requires first time offenders of drunk driving (i.e. BAC greater or equal to .08) to 
install an IID in their vehicle.  The program is limited to the participation of four counties 
(Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Tulare), but the population totals of these counties 
account for over one third of the states’ entire population or approximately 13 million people.  
Additionally, any offender who is cited and convicted of a DUI in one of these four counties is 
required to install and IID regardless of the offenders’ legal residence.  Given the guidelines of 
California’s ignition interlock pilot program, it provides an excellent case study to examine the 
effectiveness of strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders at the county level.   These 
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within state estimates have the additional benefit of avoiding potential heterogeneity that cross 
state estimates can sometimes suffer from.  The estimation procedure again follows a fixed effects 
model with a few subtle modifications, which are described in detail in the methodology section.  
The results for the case study can be seen in Table 1.7., which includes estimates for accidents 
involving drunk drivers and accidents involving drivers with positive alcohol levels. 
 These estimates indicate that strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders 
significantly reduce the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver, as well as the number 
of fatal accidents involving drivers with positive alcohol levels.  Specifically, the log accident 
model shows that strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders reduce the number of fatal 
accidents involving a drunk driver by about 25% in California.  This result is significant at the 5 
percent level.  With regard to drivers who have positive alcohol levels, the results again indicated 
that strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders have a significant impact in reducing the 
number of fatal accidents.   The estimates suggest that the policy reduced the number of fatal 
accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels by 20%.  This results is significant at the 
5 percent level.   
We can again think about these results in terms of an anticipated reduction in the actual 
number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and the anticipated reduction in the number of 
fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels if California would have applied the 
law to all counties.  In 2012, California had 719 fatal accidents involving a driver with a BAC 
greater or equal to .08, thus the strong IID policy for first time offenders would have the potential 
to prevent 3 fatal accidents for a typical county in a typical year.34  Additionally, in 2012 California 
had 842 fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels.  Using the estimation results 
                                                           
34 3.09 = (719*.25) / 58; there are 58 counties in California.   
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for this group would imply that statewide application of the strong ignition interlock pilot program 
would have had the potential to prevent 2.90 fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol 
levels for a typical county in a typical year.35   
 A previous report created by the California Department of Motor Vehicles in 2005 also 
looked at the effects of ignition interlocks on first time offenders in the state.  At the time of the 
report the policy was not mandatory and only impacted first time offenders who were convicted 
of drunk driving with a BAC of .2 or greater, thus is was a much weaker policy than the pilot 
program.  Using a Cox model, the report compared a treatment group of offenders who were 
required to install an IID to a comparison group with similar traits who were not.  The study 
differed from mine in that its particular interest was examining whether there were lasting effects 
of the IID policy that encouraged behavioral modifications of those convicted of drunk driving 
and were required to use an IID.  There were no differences between the treatment and comparison 
group subsequent crash rates following IID use (DeYoung et al. 2004).   
However, one could argue that this may be a result of the treatment and control groups 
being an extreme group of drunk drivers that are unlikely to modify their behavior and results may 
prove significant if the groups included first time offenders with BAC greater or equal to .08.  For 
instance, a study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, examined Washington’s first time 
offender IID policy and found that first time offenders were dramatically affected by the policy 
change as their two-year recidivism rate fell by 12% (McCartt et al. 2013).  On another note, the 
California DMV recently (2015), published a report on the deterrent effect of the pilot program on 
drunk driving convictions and found no support of deterrence.  The report did not examine the 
                                                           
35 2.90 = (842*.20)/ 58 
26 
 
pilot programs impact on accidents but its results that show IID laws do not deter drunk driving 
appear to be consistent with the ones found in this paper.  
It is important to note that the California estimates in this paper suffer from a short post 
treatment period, which questions whether the estimates size could be due to some unobservable 
transitory effects.  Nevertheless, the California result indicate consistency with the state level 
results presented earlier.  Additionally, whether or not strong IID laws for first time offenders 
modify the behavior of the offender in the long run, it is evident from my California case study 
and statewide results that the desired effect of reducing and preventing costly alcohol related 
accidents is possible when strong IID polices for first time offenders are in place. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
 This paper uniquely applies difference in difference fixed effects estimation methods to 
analyze the effectiveness of ignition interlock programs, at the county- and state-level in 
preventing fatal alcohol involved crashes.  Results indicate that the potential for interlock programs 
to prevent alcohol involved driving and alcohol-related crashes is most significant when the 
program is applied to a broader cross-section of offenders and a higher proportion of offenders 
have the interlock device installed.  Thus, states and counties that adopt strong IID programs, 
which require mandatory participation by first time offenders convicted of driving under the 
influence with a BAC of .08 or higher, see a significant and sizeable decrease in the number of 
costly fatal accidents involving a drunk driver or a driver with positive alcohol levels.  
Furthermore, these estimates are consistent across county- and state-level models, robust to an 
alternative measures of individual BAC, and to several alternative definitions of the dependent 
variable.  Relatedly, results indicate that incapacitation of offenders is driving the estimated effect 
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and individuals are not deterred by the laws alone.  However, given the relatively low cost of 
program implementation and high estimated benefits, theory suggests incapacitation should be the 
goal of the program. 
 With current and future legislation activity yet to be determined on the inclusion of first 
time offenders and level of participation by BAC, this paper provides evidence that allows states 
to maximize public safety.  The interlock program should be applied to first time offenders who 
are not just high-BAC offenders.  Additionally, the interlock program provides a low cost 
solution, paid for by offenders, to a dangerous and often fatal activity that imposes large social 
and economic costs on society.  To maximize public health, states with weak IID laws or states 
that currently have no interlock program which require mandatory participation for first time 
offenders, should adopt strong IID programs to prevent future costly alcohol-related fatal 
crashes. 
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Table 1.1. States with First Time Offender Ignition Interlock Laws and Effective Dates 
 
State Effective Date Enforcement 
Alaska January-2009 Strong 
Arizona September-2007 Strong 
Arkansas April-2009 Strong 
California* July-2010 Strong 
Colorado January-2009 Strong 
Connecticut January-2012 Strong 
Florida October-2010 Weak 
Hawaii January-2011 Strong 
Illinois January-2009 Strong 
Iowa July-1995 Weak 
Kansas July-2011 Strong 
Louisiana July-2007 Strong 
Maryland October-2011 Weak 
Michigan October-2010 Weak 
Minnesota July-2011 Weak 
Nebraska January-2009 Strong 
Nevada July-2005 Weak 
New Jersey January-2010 Weak 
New Mexico June-2005 Strong 
New York August-2010 Strong 
North Carolina December-2007 Weak 
Oklahoma November-2011 Weak 
Oregon January-2008 Strong 
Texas September-2005 Weak 
Utah July-2009 Strong 
Virginia July-2012 Strong 
Washington January-2009 Strong 
West Virginia July-2008 Strong 
Wisconsin July-2010 Weak 
Wyoming July-2009 Weak 
 
Notes: States Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Tennessee enacted 
Strong ignition interlock laws after 2012.  States Rhode Island and Sound Carolina enacted Weak ignition 
interlock laws after 2012. *Pilot Program: Los Angeles, Alameda, Sacramento, and Tulare (Counties)  
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics (means) 
 Pre-Treat 
(Strong) 
Post-Treat 
(Strong) 
Pre-Treat 
(Weak) 
Post-Treat 
(Weak) 
Control 
Number of Fatal 
Accidents BAC ≥ .08 
16.72 12.09 22.49 29.45 15.75 
Number of Fatal 
Accidents BAC ≥.01 
20.39 14.64 27.29 35.97 18.99 
Population 7,025,690 5,983,977 7,477,607 10,533,561 5,519,973 
Beer Tax (2012 
Cents) 
.35 .33 .24 .28 .30 
Real Gas Tax .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
Unemployment Rate 
(monthly) 
5.36 7.62 5.39 8.14 5.65 
Percent Male .495 .496 .495 .497 .492 
Real Inc. Per. Cap. 41,978 40,337 42,652 42,048 41,166 
Median age 35.8 36.4 36.9 36.9 36.9 
Percent White .786 .802 .806 .797 .809 
Percent Black .088 .081 .124 .123 .116 
Percent Asian .063 .046 .032 .041 .034 
Other .063 .071 .038 .039 .041 
Note: Accident means are reported using median BAC counts.  All estimates are weighted by state-year population. 
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Table 1.3. Results for Drunk Drivers Median BAC  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Strong -.084** 
(.0363) 
-.104*** 
(.0258) 
-.090** 
(.0399) 
Weak .019 
(.0404) 
.033 
(.0328) 
.040 
(.0376) 
Population  .742** 
(.2842) 
3.910*** 
(1.034) 
Unemployment  -.078 
(.0540) 
-.061 
(.0686) 
Real Gas Tax  .019 
(.0187) 
-.004 
(.0247) 
Percent Male  .045 
(.0296) 
.106*** 
(.0315) 
Real Income Per. Cap.  1.030*** 
(.2677) 
.873*** 
(.3631) 
Median Age  .374 
(.7414) 
.313 
(1.099) 
Percent Black  -.025 
(.0283) 
-.217*** 
(.0730) 
Percent Asian  -.011 
(.0186) 
-.001 
(.2191) 
Percent Other  .085** 
(.0360) 
-.003 
(.2307) 
Beer Tax  -.002 
(.0248) 
-.055 
(.0337) 
Other DD Policies  No Yes Yes 
State, Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
State-Time Trend Yes No Yes 
Observations 7056 7056 7056 
 
Notes: Reported results are from weighted least squares regressions, weighted by state-level 
population for 49 states over 144 months.  The dependent variable is the natural log of fatal 
accidents + 1 involving a drunk driver, i.e. BAC≥ .08.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are 
clustered to allow for nonindependence of observations from the same state.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Table 1.4. Results for Positive Alcohol Drivers Median BAC  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Strong -.060* 
(.0320) 
-087*** 
(.0252) 
-.068** 
(.0333) 
Weak .0167 
(.0380) 
.036 
(.0321) 
.039 
(.0360) 
Population  .848*** 
(.2750) 
4.115*** 
(.9859) 
Unemployment  -.067 
(.0490) 
-.065 
(.0628) 
Real Gas Tax  .022 
(.0235) 
.004 
(.0256) 
Percent Male  .421 
(.0284) 
.101*** 
(.0282) 
Real Income Per. Cap.  1.210*** 
(.2947) 
.776** 
(.3506) 
Median Age  .495 
(.7741) 
.075 
(1.034) 
Percent Black  -.040 
(.0282) 
-.210*** 
(.0665) 
Percent Asian  -.010 
(.0232) 
-.010 
(.2357) 
Percent Other  .045 
(.0434) 
-.033 
(.1823) 
Beer Tax  -.017 
(.0278) 
-.069 
(.0442) 
Other DD Policies  No Yes Yes 
State, Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
State-Time Trend Yes No Yes 
Observations 7056 7056 7056 
 
Notes: Reported results are from weighted least squares regressions, weighted by state-level 
population for 49 states over 144 months.  The dependent variable is the natural log of fatal 
accidents + 1 involving a driver with positive alcohol levels, i.e. BAC≥ .01.  Standard errors are 
in parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of observations from the same state.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 1.5. Timing of Effects (Median BAC) 
 
 (1) 
Drunk Drivers BAC ≥.08 
(2) 
Positive Alcohol BAC ≥.01 
 Strong Weak Strong Weak 
3 Months  
Before  
-.015 
(.0513) 
-.022 
(.0908) 
.007 
(.0384) 
-.007 
(.0843) 
6 Months  
Before  
-.001 
(.0590) 
.005 
(.0838) 
-.015 
(.0428) 
-.012 
(.0766) 
9 Months 
Before  
.055 
(.0582) 
.048 
(.0581) 
.053 
(.0401) 
.010 
(.0505) 
0-3 Months  
After  
-.062 
(.0425) 
.063 
(.0533) 
-.056 
(.0432) 
.086 
(.0640) 
3-9 Months 
After 
-.050 
(.0497) 
-033 
(.0378) 
-.030 
(.0472) 
-.032 
(.0332) 
9-15 Months 
After  
-.078* 
(.0426) 
.035 
(.0564) 
-.072* 
(.0415) 
.037 
(.0504) 
15 + Months 
After  
-.084** 
(.0351) 
 
.021 
(.0308) 
-.070** 
(.0347) 
.019 
(.0299) 
Other DD Policies Yes Yes 
Full Set of Controls Yes Yes 
State, Time F.E. Yes Yes 
State-Time Trend Yes Yes 
p-value: joint test 
leads (strong) 
 
.71 
 
.60 
p-value: joint test 
leads (weak) 
 
.81 
 
.98 
 
Notes: (1) and (2) represent a separate weighted least squares regressions.  The dependent variable 
is the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver +1, i.e. BAC≥ .08 and the number of fatal 
accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol +1, i.e. BAC≥ .01.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of observations from the same state.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Figure 1.1. Pre-Treatment Graph 
 
Notes: The graph is a moving average of the number of fatal drunk driving accidents in a month, 
where time period 80 corresponds to July, 2007.  The graphs shows that the pre-treatment trends 
for all groups are nearly identical.  New Mexico and Nevada are not included in the averages 
because they become treated in 2005.  However, I chose the following because the pre-treatment 
window falls right in the middle of my data (2001-2012) and most states, besides NM an NV, do 
not begin to treat until after July, 2007.  The shorter window with NM and NV included, also 
exhibits the same pre-treatment trend between all of the groups. 
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Table 1.6. Additional Estimates with Robustness Checks 
 
 Drunk Driver BAC ≥ .08 Positive Alcohol Driver BAC ≥ .01 
Strong -.104*** 
(.0258) 
-.090** 
(.0399) 
-087*** 
(.0252) 
-.068** 
(.0333) 
Weak .033 
(.0328) 
.040 
(.0376) 
.036 
(.0321) 
.039 
(.0360) 
Panel A. Alternative BAC Measure:  
Mean  
Strong -.094*** 
(.0278) 
-.066** 
(.0332) 
-.079*** 
(.0300) 
-.048* 
(.0280) 
Weak .039 
(.0331) 
.034 
(.0332) 
.021 
(.0294) 
.041 
(.0260) 
Panel B. Alternative Dependent. Variables:  
Log Number of Drinking Drivers Involved in Fatal Accident, (median BAC) 
Strong -.110*** 
(.0264) 
-.098** 
(.0411) 
-.094*** 
(.0263) 
-.079** 
(.0350) 
Weak .034 
(.0352) 
.034 
(.0412) 
.036 
(.0341) 
.034 
(.0387) 
Number of Fatal accidents i.e., levels not logs, (median BAC) 
Strong -2.590** 
(1.068) 
-2.951** 
(1.440) 
-2.262* 
(1.214) 
-2.653* 
(1.520) 
Weak 1.401 
(1.318) 
-.619 
(1.244) 
2.582 
(1.601) 
-.317 
(1.294) 
Log Alcohol-related Accident Rate per 100,000 people, (median BAC) 
Strong -.115*** 
(.0279) 
-.098** 
(.0421) 
-.094*** 
(.0261) 
-.077** 
(.0338) 
Weak .031 
(.0318) 
.039 
(.0381) 
.041 
(.0333) 
.043 
(.0392) 
Other DD Policies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full Set of Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State, Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Time Trend No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of 
observations from the same state.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 1.7. Results for California Case Study, Accidents involving a Drunk Drivers and 
Positive Alcohol Drivers 
 
 Log Accidents 
 BAC ≥ .08 BAC ≥ .01 
Strong -.257** 
(.1039) 
-.204** 
(.1016) 
Population 10.946 
(8.888) 
7.555 
(9.507) 
Unemployment .246 
(.4649) 
.2503 
(.3918) 
Percent Black .855 
(.6049) 
.709 
(.6126) 
Percent Asian .065 
(.6113) 
.361 
(.5994) 
Percent Other -.218 
(.3002) 
-.075 
(.2590) 
Percent Male .184 
(.1856) 
.201 
(.1698) 
County- time F.E. Yes Yes 
County-Time Trend Yes  Yes 
Observations 348 348 
 
Notes: Reported results are from regression for 58 total counties over 6 years.  The dependent 
variable(s) are the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver, i.e. BAC≥ .08 and the 
number of fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels, i.e. BAC≥ .01.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of 
observations from the same county.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
   ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
     * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 1.8. Total Traffic Fatalities and Ignition Inter-lock Laws 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Strong -.056** 
(.0231) 
-.057*** 
(.0153) 
-.032* 
(.0184) 
Weak .015 
(.0139) 
.006 
(.0215) 
.017 
(.0243) 
Other DD Polices  No Yes Yes 
State-, Time- F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes 
State-Time Trend No No Yes 
Observations 7056 7056 7056 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is equal to the number of total fatalities. Standard errors, corrected 
for correlation by means of clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
    * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Estimated Installed Interlocks and Alcohol-Impaired Driving Fatalities  
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Figure 1.3. Normalized Estimated Interlocks and Traffice Fatalities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Event Study 
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2 A Difficult Road Ahead: Fleet Fuel Economy, Footprint Based 
CAFE Compliance, and Manufacturer Incentives 
2.1. Introduction 
The future of the vehicle fleet and its characteristics is in flux.  Recent federal guidelines, finalized 
by the Obama Administration and U.S. automakers, have been issued by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to raise Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy standards, (CAFE), from the 35.5 mpg for 2016 model year vehicles, to 54.5 mpg 
for 2025 model year vehicles.  The increase has many wondering how vehicle manufacturers will 
comply with the new standards and the impact it may have on vehicle characteristics.  
CAFE standards, enacted in 1975 as a part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, have 
been used to encourage progress in fleet vehicle fuel economy, but the recent mandate is the largest 
change in the standards’ relatively short history. Estimates by the EPA, predict that the new 
standards will reduce oil consumption in the United States by 4 billion barrels and reduce 
greenhouse gases (GHG) by 2 billion metric tons over the lifetime of vehicles sold in model years 
2017-2025 (EPA 2012).   Additional benefits of fuel standards include consumer savings from 
reduced fuel expenditures and the creation of an estimated 570,000 new jobs throughout the U.S. 
economy (The Blue Green Alliance 2012).  However, all of these expected estimated benefits 
would be overstated if manufacturers were to comply with standards through an alternative plan, 
such as increasing vehicle sizes.  Such a plan was not originally conceived, by policy makers, as a 
possible compliance strategy for automakers, however it has the potential to undermine the 
benefits and goals of the new footprint based CAFE program.    
Since the first fuel economy target of 18 mpg for passenger cars by 1978, the fleet of vehicles 
in the United States has been ever evolving in power, size, and weight.  A rich and diverse 
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collection of research has been dedicated to CAFE standards and changing fleet characteristics, 
including their impact on safety (Anderson and Auffhammer 2011; Jacobsen 2011, 2012), energy 
policy (Greene 1998), technology (Knittel 2011), and sales (Thorpe 1997; Klier and Linn 2010), 
as well as whether CAFE polices are effective (Clerides and Zachariadis 2006).  
For this paper, two prior publications are most relevant for discussion.  Knittel (2011) serves 
as the starting point for this paper’s approach.   He uses model-level data for vehicles in the U.S. 
from 1980 to 2006 to determine compliance strategies for both Bush Administration model year 
2020 CAFE standards and the more rigid Obama Administration 2016 model year CAFE 
standards.  Congruent with results found in this paper, his results suggest that above average 
technological advances are needed for standard compliance.  Additionally, for manufacturers to 
reach fuel economy levels near or above 50 mpg, for passenger cars and light trucks, vehicle 
characteristics would have to be unrealistically downsized to the vehicle power and curb weight 
characteristics observed in 1980.  The mix of vehicles in the fleet would also have to be primarily 
passenger cars.  Unlike Knittel, I estimate results by vehicle classes, as well as passenger cars and 
light-duty trucks, which provides a more comprehensive story for compliance strategies to the new 
footprint based standards. 
 Incorporating how vehicle footprint calculations might impact manufacturer compliance 
strategies brings us to the second relevant publication of discussion.   Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012)  
look at whether manufacturers have any design incentive to increase the footprint of their vehicles 
in production as opposed to changing vehicle characteristics and performance that may be more 
in-line with consumer preferences. Using an oligopolistic-equilibrium model, they simulate the 
change in the sales-weighted average of overall vehicle size with varying consumer preferences to 
vehicle fuel economy, performance, and technology features.  The results from simulations with 
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different levels of price-elasticity of demand, suggest that manufacturers have an incentive to 
increase vehicle size in all simulations except when consumer preference for vehicle size are at its 
lowest bound.  The authors conclude that the hypothesis that footprint-based CAFE standards do 
not create incentives for manufacturers to increase vehicle size is rejected across a wide-range of 
consumer preferences.  In light of the results by Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012), I revisit the model 
developed by Knittel to see whether manufacturers have an incentive to increase vehicle size to 
lower the burden of compliance.   
Specifically, I test how changes in vehicle weight, power, other vehicle specifications, and 
annual technological progress impact fuel economy.  This study illustrates the difficulties 
manufacturers will face if compliance is only obtainable through these identifiable vehicle 
characteristics.  In comparison to Knittel, I use more recent data and extend the analysis beyond 
just passenger cars and light-duty trucks.  This is an important consideration because the new 
standards are footprint based, where smaller vehicles have relatively more stringent standards, and 
larger vehicles have less stringent standards.  Specifically, footprint calculations measure the 
relative size of a vehicle and are derived by averaging the front and rear track width and 
multiplying by the wheelbase of the vehicle.36  To incorporate footprint calculations, I stratify 
estimates by vehicle class using vehicle classifications set by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) and use average class footprints to determine designated compliance 
levels.37   
Over the 13 year span of data (2001 to 2013), I find that vehicle weight and technological 
progress are major factors in determining fuel economy among all vehicle classes.  Specifically, a 
                                                           
36 Footprint calculations: ftptit= (((ftrkit + rtrkit)/2)*whbsit )/144), which yields square feet 
37 Table 2.1. provides a description of the ten vehicle classes.  Full-size trucks do not include 2500 or 3500 models.  
See http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809979.pdf. 
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reduction in weight is most impactful in sub-compact and minivan classes, with a 10 percent 
reduction in weight within these classes associated with a 7 percent increase in fuel economy.38  
Remaining gains in fuel efficiency are the result of residual technological progress that comes 
about apart from the most identifiable vehicle characteristics.  My model identifies this residual 
technological growth at 1.9 and 1.4 percent for passenger cars and light-duty trucks per year, 
whereas average class results range from .5 to 2.1 percent. 
The results suggest that manufacturers will face difficulties in complying with standards if 
advances in technology continue at an average level and the only other compliance measures are 
attempted through changing basic vehicle characteristics such as weight and power.  Significant 
additional technological progress beyond current rates of progress are needed for each class of 
vehicles to reach compliance. Only two classes of vehicles (minivans and compact SUV) are able 
to comply with the 2025 standards without experiencing the maximum estimated technological 
growth.39 
Despite the NHTSA belief, that the new footprint based standards are designed in such a 
way that the standards do not encourage manufactures to increase vehicle footprints (NHTSA 
2009), my estimates suggest manufactures have an incentive to increase vehicle footprints in order 
to fall to a more conservative fuel economy level that is achievable with smaller changes to vehicle 
weight, power, and is less dependent on technological advances.  This incentive undermines the 
standards potential to reduced oil consumption and reduced emission levels that would come from 
the fuel efficient vehicles the program is designed to create.   
                                                           
38 A 10 percent reduction in weight increases fuel economy for passenger cars and light-duty trucks by 3 percent.   
These results are slightly less than those found by Knittel (2011) of approx. 4 percent for vehicle data 1980 to 2006, 
and may suggest manufacturers are finding less need to reduce weight in order to improve fuel economy     
39 Maximum estimated technological progress is obtained from the difference between years of technological 
progress estimates.  By ordering these technology growths from smallest to largest I am also able to select the 75th 
percentile.    
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 Alternatively, manufacturers may also have the incentive to take advantage of the CAFE 
programs built in flexibilities which introduce credits and compliance multipliers that lower the 
burden of compliance.  For this paper, I do not model CAFE program flexibilities but incorporate 
them into discussion as relevant manufacturer alternatives for potential compliance.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology used for estimation.  Section 3 explores the empirical results at the passenger car and 
light-duty truck level, class-level, and results for compliance strategies incorporating footprint 
measures. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2.2. Data and Methodology 
2.2.1. Data Source    
Data for all new vehicles sold in the United States from 2001 to 2013 are obtained from Edmunds.  
A rich set of specifications is described within the data including curb weight, transmission-type, 
aspiration method, engine specifications, and size measurements. Vehicle dimensions are used to 
compute each vehicles footprint for post estimation compliance strategies.  The smallest average 
footprint, for model year 2013 vehicles, belongs to class 1, sub-compact passenger cars, at 40.2 
square feet and the largest belongs to class 10, full-size trucks, at 66.4 square feet.  
Several specifications are not used in estimation but are used to provide useful graphical 
analysis with regard to vehicle trends. For example, Figure 2.1. provides graphical evidence of the 
share of vehicles using available fuel saving technologies.  The figure shows some of the 
technologies that are captured by the residual technological progress estimates and the increased 
use of these technologies by manufacturers.  In particular, the figure shows a decline in four or 
five speed transmissions and an increase in advanced transmissions technologies such as six speeds 
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or more as well as, continuously variable transmissions.  Tests on the impact the number of 
transmission speeds has on fuel economy, by the EPA, have shown that an additional gear can 
improve fuel efficiency by as much as two percent, compared to four speed transmissions.40  
Additionally, the figure shows the existence and increased penetration of other new technologies 
such as stop-start systems which automatically turn off the vehicle’s engine when the vehicle is 
idling.  Overall, the figure provides information on how the newer vehicles in this study differ 
from those in Knittel (2011) and also provides evidence for the persistent technological progress 
estimates found in both studies.      
Table 2.2. provides the summary statistics of the data used in analysis.  Specifically, the 
minimum horsepower for any vehicle is 70 and the maximum is 570.41   The min and max of fuel 
economy, for all passenger vehicles used in estimation, is 10.7 and 53.4 mpg, which is in terms of 
window sticker mpg. For light-duty trucks, it is 9.35 and 32.65 mpg.42  A total of 21,379 
observations are used to estimate the models and observations with missing values are not included 
in the estimations. 
 
2.2.2. Methodology  
As described by Knittel (2011), the goal of this empirical work is to estimate the technical 
relationship between vehicle weight, engine power and fuel economy. The production possibilities 
frontier (PPF) illustrates the trade-off between these characteristics.  Relative to the base year of 
2001, shifts in the PPF represent advances in vehicle technology.  These advances have many 
                                                           
40 See https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tech_transmission.shtml for more details on advanced transmission 
technologies.  
41 To eliminate extreme values of horsepower and fuel economy, I created a class 11, or 2-door sport, but I do not 
estimate this class.  Similarly, no electric vehicle observations are included in the estimation models.  
42 CAFE compliance is not determined by window sticker fuel economy but by the unadjusted fuel economy level.  I 
convert average window sticker fuel economy levels, to the approximate CAFE equivalent value during the 
compliance strategy section, the conversion process is briefly explained in this section as well.  
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forms from engine, transmission, aerodynamic, etc. improvements to the vehicle. Technology 
expenditures are omitted from regressions but any potential bias is assumed to small.  I use the 
estimates to analyze how future vehicles with look if I reduce vehicle attributes and assume various 
rates of technological progress.  This follows the work of Knittel (2011).43   
Overall, I can use estimates to focus on a direct approach to compliance, where I assume 
compliance would require manufacturers to improve average class fuel economy to the designated 
compliance levels determined by the average class footprint.  I consider the physical and structural 
options that manufactures have the ability to change, within reason, to increase fuel economy.  For 
instance, as pointed out by Cheah et. al (2009) vehicle weight, size, and power are major factors 
in determining vehicle fuel economy and they believe a relative downsizing may be necessary to 
achieve a fuel use reduction.  Combining the impact of the vehicle’s curb weight and power with 
fuel efficiency improvements attributed to technological progress, I model the changes necessary 
to reach standards set for model year 2025 vehicles.  Following Cobb-Douglass assumptions the 
analysis takes the subsequent functional form and is described below.44   
Using a basic linear regression model, I estimate: 
 
(1) ln(mpgit) = β0 + β1ln(curbwtit) + β2ln(hpit) + β3ln(torit) + τt + µi + βj`Xit + εit  
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of average window sticker fuel economy, where 
subscripts describe individual vehicles in each class for a given year. 45  Vehicle curb weight 
(curbwt) is the vehicle’s standing weight in complete operating condition including fluids.  
                                                           
43 For detailed descriptions of the identification strategy please see Knittel (2011).  
44 Translog functional form estimates are included in the appendix. 
45 Average fuel economy (mpg) is calculated through a weighted average of city and highway vehicle and year 
specific fuel economy i.e.: mpgit =  .55 (Citympgit) + .45 (Hwympgit) 
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Horsepower and torque are (hp) and (tor), respectively.  Multiple measures of vehicle power are 
included in the regression because horsepower and torque are highly correlated and interpreting 
the impact on fuel economy in only one of these variables is challenging.46   (Xit) includes, 
transmission type, and engine type.  µi represents manufacturer fixed effects.47 The error term is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with controls and mean-zero.  
Year fixed effects (τt) are assumed to capture residual technological progress in improved 
fuel efficiency for that year.  I am not interested in the impact of specific technologies.48  Instead, 
the fixed effects allow for estimates of overall technological growth among the fleet and vehicle 
classes, holding measurable vehicle characteristics constant.49   
I estimate various versions of equation (1), each including various combinations of 
determinants of fuel economy.  The results obtained from the model later described as Model 3 is 
used to infer compliance strategies and to project fuel economy levels for model year 2025 
vehicles.  This model allows for the most flexibility in estimating technological progress by 
limiting X to include only controls for manual, diesel, and manufacturer fixed effects.  The impact 
of any of the other specific technologies, which are controlled for in other versions, are assumed 
to be absorbed by the year fixed effects.  
I use the coefficient results from this model, along with the baseline average class fuel 
economy for model year 2013, to project fuel economy improvement over various scenarios for 
                                                           
46 For passenger cars pairwise correlations for horsepower and torque is 0.95 and for light-duty trucks it is 0.91.  
47 I do not make special considerations for vehicle manufacturers that merge companies.  All manufacturers are 
considered separate across the sample period.    
48 For example, one might be interested in the impact of variable valve timing (VVT), a technology that determines 
the optimal rate of air flow for the vehicle depending on the engine speed and power needed. The EPA estimates that 
VVT has the potential to improve efficiency by 5 percent.  Another is cylinder deactivation, which is a technology 
that shuts down cylinders once the vehicles has reached a cruising speed and less power is needed to maintain the 
vehicles rate of motion. 
49 I do allow of some model variations to incorporate popular technologies of interest such as turbo-charged, hybrid, 
and super-charged technologies. 
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changes in vehicle weight, power, and rates of technological progress.  The implied changes to 
basic vehicles specifications allow me to see whether manufacturers will be able to comply with 
the recently mandated CAFE standards.50  
 
2.3. Results  
2.3.1. Passenger Car and Light-Duty Truck 
The estimation results for passenger cars and light-duty trucks are summarized in Table 2.3.  Model 
1 includes vehicle weight, performance and transmission controls, as well as a set of controls for 
specific technologies of interest (i.e., diesel fuel, turbocharger, supercharger and hybrid).  Model 
2 adds manufacturer fixed-effects to Model 1 and Model 3 drops the turbocharger, supercharger, 
and hybrid controls in order for these technologies to be absorbed by the year fixed effects, 
described earlier as the residual technological progress estimates.51 
Analyzing the results for specific technology indicators of Model 2, we can see that both 
passenger cars and light-duty trucks benefit from turbochargers, which lead to efficiency gains of 
5.4 percent and 6.5 percent respectively.  Passenger cars also see fuel improvements of 3.6 percent 
from superchargers, whereas, the results for light-duty trucks are inconclusive.  Cars and trucks 
that utilize hybrid technology see fuel improvements of 29.6 and 28.2 percent.52  
                                                           
50 I cluster vehicle manufacturers for passenger car and light-duty truck models, since modeling errors are assumed 
to be correlated within clusters but uncorrelated across clusters (Cameron and Miller 2013).  This helps to ensure 
that the model is obtaining accurate standard-errors and that t-statistics are not misleadingly large.  Class level 
estimates are reported with robust standard errors as clustered groups are few and even with bias-correction result 
using clusters can lead to over-rejection (Cameron and Miller 2013).  For this paper, I do not provide robustness 
checks for this model and ask the reader to look towards Knittel (2011) for other estimation methodologies. 
51 Model 3 is assumed to provide the best estimate of technological progress, thus this model specification is the 
only model estimated at the class level.  Results of identifiable characteristic controls that are discussed throughout 
the paper come from Model 3.  Model 2 is used to highlight the effect of current popular technologies of interest. 
52 Hybrids utilize large battery packs which improve fuel economy for several reasons including 1) regenerative 
braking capture energy and charge battery, 2) two sources of power allow engine to operate at maximum efficiency, 
3) the engine can be shut off at idle. Along with monitoring the use of Hybrid technology the EPA is also following 
manufacturer plans to “turbo-downsize” engines. Turbo-downsizing allows for efficiency gains from having smaller 
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Interpreting the results of Model 3, we can discuss the impact identifiable vehicle 
characteristics have on fuel economy.  For instance, with regard to passenger cars, the results 
imply, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent reduction in the vehicles’ curb weight would yield an increase 
in fuel economy by 3 percent. Given the average weight for all passenger cars, this would imply a 
333 pound reduction in weight. Additionally, a 10 percent increase in horsepower has a negative 
impact on fuel economy of 2.93 percent. Passenger cars powered by diesel combustion engines 
are 23.4 percent more fuel efficient than those that are not, which is consistent with results found 
in Knittel.  Furthermore, in comparison with Knittels’ results the gains in fuel economy due to 
having a manual transmission have disappeared with modern vehicles.53   This could reflect 
technological improvements that have been made to automatic transmissions including the number 
of speeds, continuously variable speeds, and new transmissions such as automated manual.  
Likewise, Model 3 results for light-duty trucks imply a 10 percent reduction in vehicle curb 
weight would improve fuel economy by 3 percent.  Vehicle torque becomes highly impactful on 
fuel economy, in that a 10 percent increase would decrease fuel economy by nearly 6 percent, 
whereas an increase in horsepower would yield fuel savings of 3.2 percent.54  Finally, manual 
transmissions reduce fuel economy by 2.6% and diesel powered engines are 48.4 percent more 
efficient than gasoline powered engines.  The impact of diesel combustion engines is substantially 
larger than the results found in Knittel, 24 to 27 percent, and could represent dramatic 
improvements in diesel combustion engines thermal efficiency.55  However, the result could suffer 
                                                           
engines but yet still providing and potentially satisfying consumers’ desire for vehicle performance.  The EPA is 
also currently researching the benefits and impact of Hydraulic Hybrids on the vehicle fleet. This vehicle 
specification was not indicated in the data for my analysis. (EPA, Trends Report 2013 pg.53)  
53 Knittel finds that manual transmissions improve fuel economy by nearly 5 percent for passenger cars. 
54 As pointed out be Knittel (2011), torque and horsepower are highly correlated in that horsepower = 
torque*RPM ⁄ 5250.  
55 The result is consistent with previous evidence that larger more powerful diesel engines see more efficiency gains 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/kids/energyfacts/. 
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from having a small sample of diesel trucks, as only 0.005 percent of light-duty trucks in the 
sample are diesel engines as opposed to the 0.05 that exist in Knittels’ sample. 
With regard to average technological progress estimates, the annual fuel efficiency gains 
from residual technological progress average 1.77 and 1.53 percent for passenger cars and light-
duty trucks, respectively.  These results are nearly identical to those reported in Knittel, which 
found average technological progress to be 1.76 and 1.78. The lower average technological 
progress for trucks could be because the rate of technological progress slows for light-duty trucks 
after 2008.  This is likely due to falling gasoline prices in the U.S, which is consistent with previous 
literature such as Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002).  Specifically, these studies find that the 
rate of energy innovation depends on both regulatory standards as well as energy prices.   
 
2.3.2. Class-Level  
Estimation results for the 10 vehicle classes, using the Model 3 specification, are summarized in 
Table 2.4.  From the results, we can see that both Sub-Compact and Mini-van classes of vehicles 
have the greatest gains in fuel economy with a reduction in vehicle weight.  Specifically, a 10 
percent reduction in weight would generate over a 7 percent increase in fuel economy, for both 
classes.  All other classes range from 2 percent to 5.2 percent improvement in fuel economy with 
a 10 percent reduction in weight. Comparing the impact of vehicle horsepower for the 10 classes, 
the results indicate that classes 1 through 4 see negative effects; in that, a 10 percent increase would 
yield a decrease in fuel economy ranging from 1.6 to 4.7 percent.  For classes 5 through 10, also 
known as light-duty trucks, the class would either benefit from an increase in horsepower (classes 
5,7,9, 10), are inclusive (class 8), or see a loss in fuel economy (class 6).  However, as mentioned 
earlier horsepower and torque are highly correlated and can have a different impact on fuel 
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efficiency depending on the use of the vehicle.  Specifically, in classes 6 through 10, which makes 
up the majority of the previously described group of light-duty trucks, torque is more highly 
correlated with reduced fuel economy.56  Most of the vehicles in these classes have towing 
capabilities where power in the form of torque is needed for the vehicle to engage in the initial 
stage of work.  This also sheds more light on why diesel engines are more efficient as they are 
cable of generating more low-end torque at lower rpm’s which generates efficiency.  Not all 
models at the class level are able to provide insight on desired controls, such as manual 
transmission and diesel engines, due to missing data.  
Figure 2.2. plots technological progress estimates for each of the 10 classes. Comparing 
results of average annual technological progress, we see that class 3 (Mid-size passenger cars), 
exhibited the highest at 2.1 percent and class 6 (Large Van) the lowest at half of a percent.  57 
Largest technological growth between years range from 3 to 7 percent for all classes, in which 4 
of the 10 classes exhibit a period of growth, at some point between 2001 and 2013 model year 
vehicles, of 4 percent or greater.  
 
2.3.3. Footprint Based Compliance Strategies  
To complete the compliance section of this paper, average class window sticker fuel economy for 
model year 2013 vehicles are converted into CAFE-equivalent fuel economy values.  In reality, 
actual fuel economy of a vehicle is determined largely by how the consumer drives the vehicle. 
For example speed, acceleration, braking, weather conditions, and air conditioning use are all 
important factors. The EPA considers these factors when determining the sticker MPG. This is 
                                                           
56 This result is consistent with Knittel (2011) and Klier and Linn (2014) in which the latter only includes one 
measure of power, horsepower for passenger car and torque for light trucks, in their estimates with fuel consumption 
as the dependent variable. 
57 Class 6 suffers from a small sample size of 254 observations 
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why the sticker MPG is much lower than the CAFE standards.   The EPA uses a 5-cycle method 
to adjust tested vehicle fuel economy to the window sticker fuel economy, which is the measure 
of fuel efficiency consumers see when purchasing a vehicle.  This value is also the fuel economy 
reported by Edmunds.  To determine CAFE compliance by vehicle class, I need unadjusted fuel 
economy values.  To obtain an approximate conversion factor, I use a conversion file provided by 
the EPA to determine that the 54.5 mpg CAFE fleet standard is equal to roughly 39.5 mpg adjusted 
fleet fuel economy (i.e., window sticker fuel economy), which is approximately a 38 percent 
difference.  The conversion varies for specific vehicles at high and low levels of fuel economy.  
However after comparing several vehicle models in different classes and for simplicity, I assume 
the adjusted fuel economy to CAFE equivalent is approximately a 34 percent increase.  I use this 
value to adjust vehicle fuel economy throughout the remainder of the paper in order to discuss 
compliance and results.  
The second phase (2017 to 2025) of the EPA designed CAFE program allows for several 
flexibilities, in which manufacturers can use to comply with standards.  Flexibilities include 
building credits from A/C (air conditioning) improvements that lower CO2 emissions and credits 
for implementing off-cycle technologies, such as solar panels, hybrids, and engine stop start.  
Additionally, manufacturers will be allowed to bank and trade these credits, which the EPA hopes 
will ease the transition into the stringent phase two standards.  There are also incentives built into 
the program that encourage manufacturers to incorporate advanced technologies and more electric 
(EV), Plug in hybrid electric (PHEV), fuel-cell (FCV), and compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles 
56 
 
into production, which will act as a multiplier towards compliance.58  All of the described program 
flexibilities are designed to lower the burden of compliance.59 
 As stated earlier however, the goal of this paper was not to present all possible ways vehicle 
manufacturers could comply with the more stringent CAFE standards but instead is to showcase 
the challenges manufacturers will face if they attempt to comply using a direct approach of 
changing only identifiable vehicle characteristics.  Thus, I do not attempt to model the CAFE 
programs flexibilities but reiterate that manufacturers must experience significant technological 
growth, take advantage of program flexibilities, or lower the burden of compliance through vehicle 
footprint size in order to reach compliance.  This is why program provisions were created by the 
EPA, so that manufacturers would have time to make the technological improvements required to 
reach the final stage fuel economies set for year 2025.  However, as pointed on this paper 
alternatively manufacturers may choose to increase vehicle sizes instead of pursuing technological 
advances thus undermining the goals of the program.  In order to pursue the previously describe 
direct approach method of compliance, Table 2.5. summarizes the vehicle characteristics for all 
classes in year 2013, including average adjusted fuel economy, the CAFE- equivalent value, curb 
weight, horsepower, torque and calculated average class footprint.  Table 2.6., labeled class 
compliance and footprint increase incentive, illustrates each classes 2025 model year projected 
compliance target with the predicted fuel economy of the class.60   
                                                           
58 It is important to note that manufacturer compliance is also determined by production levels of each vehicle and 
not just model or class level fuel economy.  Thus, fleet fuel economy is calculated using a harmonic mean.  For this 
paper, neither sales nor production data were available. 
59 For more information on program flexibilities see http://www3.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f12051.pdf.  
60 Compliance targets are determined by the average class footprint in this paper.  See 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf for information regarding vehicle footprint size and CAFE 
compliance levels.   
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Predicted CAFE fuel economy(s) are generated by adjusting 2013 average mpg for each 
class by the Model 3 results for weight, power, and technological progress.61  I assume three rates 
of technological progress: average progress, 75th percentile, and maximum estimated progress.62 
Additionally, I consider weight reductions of 10 and 20 percent. The weight reductions are 
reasonable when considering the possible introduction of high-strength aluminum steel frames.  
Ford has already introduced this technology with their 2015 model year F-150’s, which weigh as 
much as 700 lbs. less than previous models (Ford Manufacturer website).  This 700 lb. reduction 
is approximately 14 percent of the class 10, full-size truck average curb weight.  Additionally, the 
weight changes are consistent with history for plausible reductions as weight has increased 6.5 and 
17.5 percent for cars and trucks respectively, over the 2001 to 2013 time period.  In comparison to 
the Knittel’s (2011) study and the 1980 average weight, values have increased 11 and 20 percent.   
Finally, to incorporate a possible change to performance characteristics, a 10 and 20 percent 
increase or decrease to each vehicle class most influential power measure was also factored into 
possible compliance strategies.63  Again, these are reasonable adjustments given that the average 
passenger car in 2013 has about 27 percent more horsepower and the average light-duty truck has 
27 percent more torque, than the vehicle models available in 2001. 
From the projection results, it is apparent that manufacturers will have a difficult time 
complying with the standards set for model year 2025 vehicles through changing vehicle 
characteristics alone. This result is conducive with those found by Bastani et al. (2012), in that, 
                                                           
61 I change the power measure that is most highly correlate with fuel consumption in each class.  Thus, classes 1-4, 6 
have implied reductions in horsepower, class’s 7-10 reductions in torque, and class 5 in class 5 horsepower is 
increased.  It is important to briefly reiterate that class 5 and 6 have small sample sizes and are likely not precisely 
estimated.   
62 Technological progress rates come from the difference of technological progress estimates that can be seen in 
Table 2.5.  Ranking the rates from smallest to largest allows me to identify the 75th percentile and maximum 
estimated growth rate. 
63 See footnote 23. 
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they find the likelihood of combined compliance of passenger cars and light-duty trucks meeting 
or exceeding the 2025 standards is less than 1 percent.  In fact my results indicate, only two classes 
of vehicles, compact SUV and Minivans, were able to reach the compliance level without 
substantial technological progress in fuel economy, i.e.: maximum estimated technological 
progress.  All vehicle classes were able to comply when vehicle weight was decreased by 10 or 20 
percent, power was changed by 10 percent and fuel improvements attributed to technological 
progress was assumed to continue at each classes estimated maximum.64  This also illustrates how 
important continued application of existing technologies and technological progress will be in 
maintaining a vehicle fleet that is similar to those consumers have grown accustom too.  As pointed 
out by Klier and Linn (2011), consumers value an increase in power more than a proportional 
increase in fuel economy.  Thus, drastic changes to vehicle characteristics, due to manufacturers’ 
attempts to comply with CAFE standards, may impact demand in the market for new vehicles.  
Considering these results, it would be practical for manufacturers to take advantage of the 
CAFE programs flexibilities and incentives, including, obtaining credits through either emission 
reducing technologies or from trading with other manufacturers.  Increasing production and sales 
of EV, PHEV, CNG, and FCV vehicles would also help since these vehicles would count as more 
than one vehicle in the manufacturers’ compliance calculation for 2017 to 2021 model year 
vehicles.  From the Model 2 estimation results, we also know that the increase in fuel efficiency 
from hybrid technology is 30 percent and 28 percent for passenger cars and light-duty trucks. 
Turbo-downsizing is another avenue manufacturers may wish to pursue since prior research 
indicates vehicle power is a significant factor in consumer vehicle choice.  Estimates also show 
that the existence of turbochargers improves fuel efficiency by 5.4 and 6.5 percent for passenger 
                                                           
64 Maximum technological progress estimates range from 3 to 7.3 percent for the various classes of vehicles.  
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cars and light-duty trucks, thus improving fuel economy but still keeping the power consumers 
desire.   
Further investigation shows that manufacturers may also have an incentive to increase the 
size (“footprint”) of their vehicles in order to fall to a lower required CAFE compliance standard.  
Previous research by Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) supports the idea that footprint-based CAFE 
standards do create incentives to increase vehicle size, dependent on assumptions made about 
consumer preferences.  Table 2.6. also represents the increased attainability of compliance from 
an increase of 10 percent to average class footprint.  On average this 10 percent change results in 
a 4.6 sq. ft. increase in the vehicles footprint.  This is a relatively small change in the vehicles size 
and for most classes this value could be obtained with an increase in the track-width and wheelbase 
by four inches or less.  Additionally, this increase in size is still modest compared to the estimated 
results in Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) which suggest that the incentive to increase vehicle size is 
5.7 and 9.9 sq. ft. for passenger cars and light-duty trucks, respectively. 
Highlighted values in the table indicate acceptable compliance levels of fuel economy.  The 
results illustrate that after average class footprint is increased, eight out of the ten classes no longer 
require maximum technological progress in order to reach compliance.  Three of those eight only 
require average technological progress to comply with standards.  Additionally, if technological 
progress is assumed to continue at the 75th percentile, 4 classes meet compliance standards with 
only a 10 percent weight reduction, along with a 10 percent change to power.  Even more 
interesting is that the 10 percent increase in footprint allows six out of ten classes to comply 
without any change to power measures at all.  This is a desirable option given that Whitefoot and 
Skerlos (2012) find that consumers are willing to pay $160-$5500 more from an additional 0.1 
hp/lb in acceleration performance.  Given prior results presented about the difficulty manufacturers 
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will face when attempting to comply with the stringent CAFE standards.  It is clear from the results, 
that increasing the footprint of their vehicles in production will make them less dependent on 
technological progress and require smaller changes to the existing characteristics of the fleet.65  
 
2.4. Conclusion  
This paper estimates the impact of identifiable vehicle characteristics have on fuel economy, as 
well as estimating technological advances that have occurred over the model year 2001 to 2013 
vehicle fleet.  Estimates were used with average footprint calculations, for each vehicle class, to 
discuss possible compliance strategies for the CAFE standards set for 2025 model year vehicles.  
The results suggest that a difficult road is ahead for manufacturers who attempt to comply 
with standards by changing identifiable vehicle characteristics, such as curb weight and power 
alone.  It is also evident that significant technological progress will be needed to improve fuel 
economy to the compliance levels.  This plays into the flexible incentive based design of the 
program and encourages manufacturers to improve and use existing fuel technologies to earn 
credits and multipliers that could be used in final compliance calculations.  However, under the 
current CAFE policy the burden of compliance may also incentivize manufacturers to increase 
vehicle size in order to fall to a lower footprint based compliance level.  This issue of incentivizing 
alternative means of compliance may not have been considered as a potential problem by those in 
charge of designing the new CAFE standards. The potential incentive to increase vehicle size to 
attain compliance is counterproductive to the fuel improvements CAFE standards are designed to 
                                                           
65 The increase in vehicle size may also require unwanted changes to vehicle weight, which lowers fuel efficiency, 
but this could be countered by the use of lighter high-strength aluminum frames. 
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generate among the fleet.  It also creates vehicle safety concerns when considering the possibility 
of an increasing gap between the size of small and large vehicle classes.     
Continued research on the impact of the stringent standards, on vehicle safety, fuel 
efficiency, the market for new vehicles, environmental issues, and vehicle insurance will be crucial 
for policy analysis of the current footprint based CAFE standards.  This paper adds to the prior 
literature and continued research on CAFE policy and highlights the difficulties manufacturers 
will face as they set out to comply with the footprint based 2025 model year vehicle standards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
References 
 
Anderson, Michael L., and Maximilian Auffhammer. "Pounds that kill: the external costs of 
vehicle weight." The Review of Economic Studies 81.2 (2014): 535-571. 
 
Bastani, Parisa, John B. Heywood, and Chris Hope. "U.S. Cafe Standards." MIT.edu, (2012). 
 
Cameron, A. Colin, and Douglas L. Miller. "A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust 
Inference." Forthcoming in Journal of Human Resources (2013). 
 
Chris Busch, John Laitner, Rob McCulloch, and Ivana Stosic “Smart Standards Create Good 
Jobs Building Cleaner Cars.” The Blue Green Alliance (2012). 
 
Clerides, Sofronis, and Theodoros Zachariadis. “Are standards effective in improving 
automobile fuel economy”. No. 6-2006. University of Cyprus Department of Economics, 2006. 
 
Edmunds, Dan. "FAQ: New Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards." Edmunds. N.p., 9 
Sept. 2013.  
 
Ford Manufacturer Website ‘http://www.ford.com/trucks/f150/2015/” 
 
Greene, David L. "Why CAFE worked." Energy Policy 26.8 (1998): 595-613. 
 
Jacobsen, Mark R. "Fuel economy, car class mix, and safety." The American Economic 
Review 101.3 (2011): 105-109. 
 
Jacobsen, Mark R. “Fuel Economy and Safety: The Influences of Vehicle Class and Driver 
Behavior.” No. w18012. National Bureau of Economic Research, (2012). 
 
Klier, Thomas, and Joshua Linn. "New‐vehicle characteristics and the cost of the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy standard." The RAND Journal of Economics 43.1 (2012): 186-213. 
 
Klier, Thomas, and Joshua Linn. "The Effect of Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards on 
Technology Adoption." Resources for the Future working paper. (2014). 
 
Knittel, Christopher R. "Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute Trade-Offs and 
Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector." American Economic Review, 101.7 (2011): 
3368-99. 
 
Newell, J. Richard, Jaffe, B. Adam, and Robert N. Stavins. “The induced innovation hypothesis 
and energy saving technological change.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1999). 114 (3): 941-
975. 
 
Popp, David. "Induced Innovation and Energy Prices." American Economic Review, 92(1): 
(2002): 160-180. 
 
63 
 
Thorpe, Steven G. "Fuel economy standards, new vehicle sales, and average fuel 
efficiency." Journal of Regulatory Economics 11.3 (1997): 311-326. 
 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2013, DOE/EIA 0383(2013) 
Washington, DC: September (2013), website www.eia.gov/aer 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975-2013,” U.S. EPA-420-R-13-011, Office of 
Transportation and Air Quality, December 2013. 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “EPA and NHTSA Set Standards to Reduce Greenhouse 
Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Model Years 2017-2025 Cars and Light Trucks,” U.S. 
EPA-420-F-12-051, Office of Transportaion and Air Quality, August 2012. 
 
U.S. National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration. “Proposed rulemaking to establish 
light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards and corporate average fuel economy 
standard,” Federal Register 74, no. 186, September 2009. 
 
Whitefoot, Kate S., and Steven J. Skerlos. "Design incentives to increase vehicle size created 
from the US footprint-based fuel economy standards." Energy Policy 41 (2012): 402-411. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
Figure 2.1. Penetration of Fuel Improving Technologies  
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Figure 2.2. Technological Progress by Vehicle Class 
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Table 2.1. Vehicle Classes  
 
Vehicle Classes 
Vehicle Type Description Name Example 
 
 
 
Passenger Cars 
Class 1: Wheelbase under 
100 in. 
Subcompact Toyota “Yaris” 
Class 2: Wheelbase 100-
104 in 
Compact Honda “Civic” 
Class 3: Wheelbase 105-
109 in 
Midsize Chevy “Malibu” 
Class 4: Wheelbase > 109 
in. 
Full-Size Volkswagen 
“Passat” 
 
 
 
Light-Duty Trucks 
Class 5: Unibody Minivans Dodge “Caravan” 
Class 6: Frame Based Large Van GMC “Savana” 
Class 7: FARS 
classification 
Compact SUV Ford “Escape” 
Class 8: FARS 
classification 
Large SUV Acura “MDX” 
Class 9: Under 4500 lbs Compact Truck Chevy “Colorado” 
Class 10: Over 4500 lbs Full-Size Truck Ram “1500” 
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks 
 
Passenger Cars 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 2001 Mean 2013 
Mean 
Fuel Economy 23.68 5.12 10.70 53.40 22.85 26.65 
Curb Weight 3329.42 582.43 1808 6814 3157.49 3363.54 
Horsepower 217.64 95.62 70 570 180.78 230.48 
Torque 215.16 92.75 68 774 188.80 225.63 
Diesel 0.019 0.138 0 1 0.016 .040 
Manual 0.381 0.486 0 1 0.405 0.320 
Supercharged 0.021 0.142 0 1 0.018 0.025 
Turbocharged 0.171 0.377 0 1 0.105 0.319 
Hybrid 0.020 0.140 0 1 0.006 0.056 
Sample Size 10,851    669 1186 
Light-Duty Trucks 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 2001 Mean 2013 
Mean 
Fuel Economy 17.80 2.96 9.35 32.65 17.28 19.56 
Curb Weight 4438.89 775.07 2624 7154 3932.62 4619.94 
Horsepower 245.91 66.38 97 555 191.16 274.94 
Torque 266.72 73.41 103 575 222.50 282.59 
Diesel 0.005 0.067 0 1 0.005 0.012 
Manual 0.181 0.385 0 1 0.355 0.063 
Supercharged 0.009 0.094 0 1 0.015 0.009 
Turbocharged 0.026 0.159 0 1 0.005 0.091 
Hybrid 0.015 0.123 0 1 Omitted 0.028 
Sample Size 10,528    592 759 
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Table 2.3. Estimates of Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks 
 
 Passenger Cars Light-Duty Trucks 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ln(curbwt) 
-0.254*** 
(0.070) 
-0.300*** 
(0.042) 
-0.299*** 
(0.065) 
-0.314*** 
(0.037) 
-0.328*** 
(0.040) 
-0.297*** 
(0.046) 
ln(hp) 
-0.250*** 
(0.092) 
-0.220*** 
(0.067) 
-0.293** 
(0.130) 
0.281*** 
(0.039) 
0.290*** 
(0.042) 
0.312*** 
(0.073) 
ln(torque) 
-0.102 
(0.092) 
-0.088 
(0.061) 
-0.024 
(0.147) 
-0.541*** 
(0.042) 
-0.545*** 
(0.044) 
-0.581*** 
(0.073) 
Manual 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Diesel 
0.221*** 
(0.049) 
0.240*** 
(0.033) 
0.234*** 
(0.069) 
0.413*** 
(0.029) 
0.429*** 
(0.030) 
0.484*** 
(0.049) 
Turbo 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
  
0.060*** 
(0.012) 
0.065*** 
(0.018) 
  
Super 
0.054** 
(0.027) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
  
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
  
Hybrid 
0.328*** 
(0.037) 
0.296*** 
(0.039 
  
0.288*** 
(0.022) 
0.282*** 
(0.282) 
  
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manufacturer 
Fixed-Effects 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 10851 10851 10851 10528 10528 10528 
Adjusted R2 0.850 0.902 0.860 0.815 0.828 0.779 
Average Annual 
Technological 
Progress 
 
Passenger Cars 
 
Light-Duty Trucks 
2002 0.007 -0.003 
2003 0.019 0.016 
2004 0.027 0.032 
2005 0.034 0.044 
2006 0.054 0.056 
2007 0.072 0.074 
2008 0.085 0.085 
2009 0.104 0.109 
2010 0.132 0.129 
2011 0.155 0.141 
2012 0.182 0.152 
2013 0.202 0.165 
   
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the manufacturer level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Individual model technological progress estimates are significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level. 
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Medical Marijuana on Sickness 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The merits of legalizing marijuana for medical purposes are touted by interest groups like 
High Times, MedicalMarijuanaprocon.org, and the Marijuana Policy Project.66  Claims of the 
medical benefits of marijuana are hardly unfounded.  The Institute of Medicine posit that nausea, 
appetite loss, pain, and anxiety are all afflictions that can be mitigated by marijuana (Joy et al. 
1999).  Economists have recently begun examining the effects of medical marijuana legalization 
(MML) from a variety of policy relevant angles, including traffic fatalities (Anderson et al. 
2013), suicide rates (Anderson et al. 2014), and even seat belt use (Adams et al. 2014).  Although 
there has been some work on the labor market impact of illicit marijuana use, the same is not true 
of the effect of MML.67  
To fill this void, I analyze work absences after MML.  If individuals experience relief from 
disabling symptoms, absence from work could decline.  For example, migraines result in an 
estimated annual 270 lost work days for every 1000 persons (Rasmussen 1992).  Alternatively, 
medical marijuana is likely a better means to self-medicate a variety of symptoms instead of 
alcohol.  Anderson et al. (2013) found that alcohol consumption declined after MML, and 
Marmot et al. (1993) found that heavy drinkers are more often absent from work.  Green et al. 
(2015) found that extending bar hours increased work absence.  There is also the possibility that 
MML could lead to an increase in work absences.  This suggests a complementary relationship 
                                                           
66 Cost and benefit debates, links below are those referred to above. 
http://www.hightimes.com/read/new-study-cannabis-may-help-cure-cancer 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=1325 
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/Effective-Arguments-for-Medical-Marijuana.pdf 
67 See Ours and Williams (2014) for a thorough review.  
73 
 
between alcohol and marijuana.  Previous research supporting complementarity is described in 
Anderson et al. (2014).    
Currently, 24 states allow people to use marijuana for medical purposes.  My results show 
that absences due to sickness have decline after enactment of MML, and the effect is 
concentrated on worker groups more expected to hold cards.  Overall, this paper advances the 
literature on MML by providing insight on the effect these laws have on the labor market, while 
also providing unique evidence that may encourage others to pursue research on this relatively 
untapped topic.    
  
3.2. Data and Methods 
The data were obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), March 
Current Population Survey (CPS), which contain self-reported work absence data from the 
individuals’ week of work prior to the survey.  I construct an indicator of absence from work due 
to illness/medical issues as well as demographic indicators for, gender, age cohorts, race, marital 
status, and education level.  I then link absence data to state-level legislation on medical 
marijuana. States that legalized medical marijuana from 1992-2012 are treatment states 
(indicated by the MML dummy).  All MML state data on effective dates, were obtained from 
MedicalMarijuana.procon.org.  A table of this detailed information was omitted for brevity of the 
paper but will be released to readers upon request.    
The estimation method follows a linear probability model (LPM), which tests for effects 
at the individual-level, as well as effects on subgroups most likely affected by MML.68  Although 
                                                           
68 For robustness, I also estimate a Poisson count model, which tests for overall declines in the number of individuals reporting 
absence due to illness/medical issues at the state-level.  The results found an 8 percent and 11 percent reduction for the full 
sample and full-time workers, respectively.  Results are significant at the 5 and 1 percent level.   
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there are limitations of the LPM, it provides estimates with easily interpretable coefficients and 
avoids the incidental parameters problem. 
The basic analysis takes the following form: 
(1) SAist = α + ηs + τt + µst + βMMLst + λ'Xist + εist, 
where subscripts i, s and t denote individual, state and year.  SA is a dichotomous variable 
indicating that the individual reported being absent from work due to illness, injury, or medical 
issues.69   MML is an indicator variable that captures whether the state allowed individuals to use 
marijuana for medical purposes. Thus, β is our primary coefficient of interest in both models.70  
In some specifications, I indicate states with “lax” MML (i.e. large number of card-holders, ease 
of access to marijuana, and large potential spillovers) and “strict” MML (i.e. small number of 
card holders and tougher supply-side restrictions).  Specially, “lax” states include California, 
Colorado, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington whereas, “strict” states include Alaska, Delaware, 
Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont.71  One would expect a stronger result in “lax” 
versus “strict” states.72  
Additionally, dummies for gender and age cohorts are interacted with the policy variable 
to identify an effect specific to that group.  This isolates the effect of MML on the group of 
individuals most likely to hold licenses.  The group that reports the heaviest use of marijuana for 
medicinal purposes are ages 25-44 (Nunberg et al. 2013).  Additionally, Reiman (2007) found in 
a sample of cardholders, an average age of 39.9.  In Colorado, it is 42.73  Additionally, all 
                                                           
69 The CPS is self-reported data. Given this element, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of classical 
measurement error which could impact the interpretation of the estimates in this paper.  However, the CPS is 
commonly used in studies to represent the US labor force. 
70 Lead policy variables are insignificant.  
71 See http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=005889 for cardholder numbers.   
72 Other treated states are dropped from regression.  
73 See https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CHED_MMJ_07_2014_%20MMR_report.pdf for 
statistics 
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sources report that the proportion of applicants and card-holders who are male is approximately 
70%.  The terms ηs and τt are the state and time fixed effects, which capture differences in 
sickness absence across states and differences unique to every time period in the sample.  The 
state-time trend is the linear time trend “τ” interacted with individual states “η”, that is “τ*η”, 
indicated above as µst.  The X vector includes controls for gender, age, race, marital status and 
education.    
Self-employed individuals are dropped because the meaning of absence from work is less 
clear (Lechmann et al. 2013).  Individuals who reported absence from work for reasons that are 
not health related were dropped.  However, the inclusion of either groups do not substantively 
change the results.   I also limit the sample to full-time employees because of their greater 
attachment to the labor market and value placed on the job (Bulow and Summers 1986).  Thus, 
full-time employees may be more motivated to pursue options that allow them to return to work 
sooner and as a result we would expect to see a stronger effect from MML.      
 
3.3. Results  
The LPM estimate results for the full sample are presented in columns (1)-(4). In column (1) 
the estimate is negative, significant at the 10 percent level and suggests that relative to the mean 
of the sample, respondents were 8 percent less likely to report being absent from work due to 
health issues after MML.  Column (2), presents results for “lax” and “strict” MML states and 
show “lax” states sickness absence decreased by 13 percent, relative to the mean and is 
significant at the 5 percent level.  Furthermore, to isolate the groups that are most likely to use 
medical marijuana for health issues, columns (3) and (4) report results with policy dummy 
interactions.   Relative to the mean sickness absence of the isolated group, men are nearly 9 
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percent and individuals ages 30-39 and 40-49 are 15 and 11 percent less likely to report sickness 
absence after MML.  These results are significant at the 5, 1, and 5 percent level.   
Results for full-time workers can be seen in columns (5)-(7).  Specifically, age groups 30-
39, 40-49, and 50-59 are 16, 11, and 13 percent less likely report absences due to illness/medical 
issues after MML.  These results are significant at the 1, 10, and 1 percent level, respectively.   
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
Dunn and Youngblood (1986) estimate that costs of absenteeism in the U.S. are around 24 
billion dollars a year.  Coles et al. (2007) estimate that the wage offset of a 1 percent increase in 
the absence rate is 56 cents.  The results of this paper therefore suggest that MML would 
decrease costs for employers as it has reduced self-reported absence from work due to 
illness/medical issues.  Although there is not a direct identification of those who use marijuana 
for medical purposes in the data, overall sickness absence is reduced for those in age and gender 
groups most likely to be cardholders.  
With momentum in the favor of legalized medical marijuana, it will be important to 
understand how this legislation will impact the labor market.  Given the lack of prior studies, 
more research is warranted in this area.   
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 Secondary: Applied Econometrics, Behavioral  
              
Education 
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee 
  Ph.D. Economics, May, 2016 
   “Three Essays on Public Policy and Health”  
  Advisor: Scott J. Adams 
 
University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh 
  B.S. Economics with Mathematics Minor, 2010 
 
Research 
 Peer-reviewed Publications  
 “Locked and Not Loaded: First Time Offenders and State Ignition Interlock Programs”  
International Review of Law and Economics, (2016), vol. 45, issue C, pages 1-13 
 
“A Difficult Road Ahead: Fleet Fuel Economy, Footprint Based CAFE Compliance, and  
Manufacturer Incentives” (2016) Forthcoming, Energy Economics  
 
Working Papers 
 
“The Effect of Medical Marijuana on Sickness Absence” (2015). 
 Revise and Resubmit, Health Economics 
 
“Seatbelt use as a police avoidance strategy? Behavioral responses to changes in the legality  
of marijuana possession” (2014). (with Scott J. Adams and Chad Cotti) Under Review, 
Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behavior  
 
 Work in Progress 
“Social Drinking, Social Capital, and Wages” (with Scott J. Adams and John Heywood)  
 
 “Moral Hazard and the Affordable Care Act”  
  
 “School Choice Programs, Community Development, and Juvenile Crimes (with Bryan Weber)  
  
Teaching Interests  
 Microeconomics, Labor, Health, Environmental, Public Policy 
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Teaching Experience 
 Lecturer, University of Wisconsin - Whitewater, College of Business and Economics 
  Principles of Macroeconomics, 2 sections, 2015-Current  
  Business Statistics, 2 sections, 2015-Current 
 
Adjunct Instructor, Waukesha County Technical College 
  Introductory Economics, 3 sections, 2013-2015 
 
 Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Economics Dept. 
     Instructor 
  Labor Economics and Employment Relations, 3 sections, 2012, 2014-2015 
  Environmental Economics, 1 section, 2013 
  Principles of Microeconomics, 7 sections, 2011-2014 
 
     Teaching Assistant 
  Principles of Microeconomics, 1 section, 2010 
   Prof. William L. Holahan  
  Principles of Macroeconomics, Head TA, 5 sections, 2012-2015 
   Emeritus Prof. G. Richard Meadows 
 
Economics Tutor, University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh, 2008-2010 
 
Honors and Awards 
 Chancellor Graduate Student Award, 2011-2012 
 Graduate Student Teaching Assistantship, 2010-2015 
 Outstanding Student in Economics, Oshkosh Economics Department, 2010 
 Summa Cum Laude, University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh, 2010 
 
Academic Services 
 UW-Milwaukee Open House, Economics Booth Representative 2011, 2012    
 
Computer Skills 
 STATA, MS-Office, E-Views, SAS, Guass, Maple 
 
Presentations 
“Seatbelt use as a police avoidance strategy? Behavioral responses to changes in the legality of 
marijuana possession”  University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2014 
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